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Copyrights derivative right gives an author the exclusive 
right to prepare adaptations of copyrighted works, preventing 
competitors from preparing unauthorized sequels and other 
transformations. Competition among authors for consumers in-
terested in the same subject matter thus exists only where the 
derivative right does not extend. No one can hold a copyright on 
broad plot themes, and so there was no violation of copyright 
when Hollywood studios in 1998 produced two separate movies 
about asteroids hitting the earth.1 Similarly, no one can hold a 
copyright on historical figures,2 and Hollywood plans eventu-
ally to produce three movies about Alexander the Great,3 plus 
as many as four about Ernesto Che Guevara.4 No one holds the 
copyright anymore on the French novel Les Liaisons Danger-
euses, a book which has led to at least four movies so far.5 And 




 1. See DEEP IMPACT (Paramount Pictures 1998). But dont see ARMA-
GEDDON (Touchstone Pictures 1998). 
 2. The right of personality may provide some limited protection for re-
cent historical figures, though there is controversy over whether the right of 
personality should survive the death of the person. See Edward J. Damich, 
The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral 
Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 9394 (1988) (discussing whether the right 
of personality passes to heirs after death). 
 3. See Dana Harris, Alexander the Grating: Another Macedonian on the 
March, VARIETY, Nov. 2430, 2003, at 5. 
 4. See Dana Harris, Four Guevaras? Che Sera!, VARIETY, July 2127, 
2003, at 5. 
 5. See CRUEL INTENTIONS (Columbia Pictures 1999); DANGEROUS LIAI-
SONS (Warner Bros. 1988); VALMONT (MGM, Inc. 1989); LES LIAISONS DAN-
GEREUSES (Les Films Marceau 1959). 
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works produced three different dramatizations about the Long 
Island Lolita.6 
If the derivative right did not exist, these would not be iso-
lated anecdotes. Instead, there would be far more examples of 
competition for consumers interested in similar subject matter. 
While Warner Brothers may produce one Harry Potter movie 
for each book in the series,7 competitors cannot produce an ad-
ditional three or four movies per book. Similarly, the derivative 
right ensures that while J.K. Rowling may fulfill her promise to 
create seven books in the series if she so desires,8 other authors 
will not be able to create alternative sequels without her per-
mission.9 The literature on the derivative right has treated the 
reduction in the number of works using the same copyrighted 
expression as a loss, though perhaps a justifiable incentive for 
authors to create works that might spawn derivatives. This Ar-
ticle argues, however, that the suppression of competition in 
creating adaptations of copyrighted works might instead be the 
derivative rights chief economic virtue. 
The argument is counterintuitive, because from the per-
spective of consumer welfare, more is merrier. No consumer is 
required to read or view any of the Harry Potter books or mov-
ies, and a consumer could decide to consume only the officially 
authorized works. Harrys most ardent fans might be delighted 
if every major movie studio made its own version of each Harry 
Potter book. Consumers, however, might well be better-off 
without such competition. First, while some of these films 
might be of high quality, the rush to create Harry Potter adap-
 
 6. Linda Saslow, The Victim Forgives. Others Wish to Forget. Freedom 
Looms for Amy Fisher, and the Island Groans, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 1999, 
§ 14LI, at 1. 
 7. So far, there has been one movie for each of the first four books in the 
series. See HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERERS STONE (Warner Bros. 2001); 
HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS (Warner Bros. 2002); HARRY 
POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN (Warner Bros. 2004); HARRY POTTER 
AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (Warner Bros. 2005). 
 8. The books so far are J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SOR-
CERERS STONE (1997); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF 
SECRETS (1998); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKA-
BAN (1999); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (2000); 
J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX (2003); and 
J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE (2005). 
 9. Indeed, at least one court has held that the derivative right extends 
far enough to bar a book involving another character whose experiences seem 
similar to Harry Potters. See JK Wins Tanya Grotter Court Case, BBC 
NEWSROUND, Apr. 3, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/cbbcnews/hi/uk/newsid_ 
2914000/2914331.stm. 
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tations might lower quality, as each studio makes sacrifices to 
get its product onto the screen quickly. Second, substantial 
time lags may maximize consumer excitement; a movie version 
of Harry Potter shortly following publication might have re-
duced the benefits of anticipation.10 
The derivative right thus can be defended as a tool that al-
lows authors to take their time. Less obviously, but perhaps 
just as importantly, the derivative right may enhance social 
welfare, even placing aside the potentially destructiveness of 
copyright races. The resources that are invested in copyrighted 
works sometimes might produce greater social returns if in-
vested in other copyrighted works or elsewhere in the econ-
omy.11 Movie studios presumably have limited budgets, and so 
they would have to sacrifice some other films to make the addi-
tional Harry Potter movie adaptations. Even if a Harry Potter 
adaptation presented a profit opportunity for which the studios 
could raise additional capital and expand their production 
budgets, the funds for producing an additional Harry Potter 
movie must come from somewhere. With more investment in 
Harry Potter derivatives, we will have less investment else-
where in the economy. 
Would we be better off in a world with more Harry Potter 
and less of everything else? The question is, of course, an em-
pirical one. Nonetheless, there is a strong theoretical reason to 
expect that, as a general matter, producers of works sometimes 
have inefficient incentives to create close substitutes of existing 
works rather than more original works. Suppose, for example, 
that a movie studio expects to make just a little more profit 
from producing yet another Harry Potter adaptation than from 
producing a movie based on a script involving some new char-
acter, call him Troy P. Rather (an anagram for Harry Potter). 
In a world without the derivative right, the producer will 
choose the Harry Potter movie. But many viewers of this movie 
might have been almost as content to see one of the other adap-
 
 10. The maxim that good things come to those who wait seems even more 
obvious for the Lord of the Rings trilogy. See, e.g., John Marks, Goodbye, Darth 
Vader. Hello, Gandalf: Will Lord of the Rings Be the Next Retro Hit?, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 1997, at 56 (reporting that film rights to the 
trilogy were finally on the verge of being licensed). Studios might not have 
been willing to devote the enormous investment this project required if nu-
merous cheaper unauthorized adaptations of the work had already existed. 
 11. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyrights Incentives-Access 
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 48788 (1996) (noting that to create addi-
tional works, resources must be stripped from other sectors of the economy). 
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tations if this additional adaptation had not been created. As a 
result, the new adaptation may result in a lower increment to 
consumer welfare than the project with Troy P. Rather. The 
general problem is that, in a world without the derivative right, 
unauthorized derivative works will tend to be close substitutes 
for the authorized derivative works. And they will tend to be 
even closer substitutes for other unauthorized derivative 
works. Thus, sales of unauthorized derivative works are more 
likely than sales of original works to come at the expense of 
other works, and there will be an incentive that nudges authors 
toward inefficiently high levels of imitation. 
There are possible objections to this argument, but none 
can refute the possibility that by suppressing the production of 
close economic substitutes beyond the number that the copy-
right owner agrees to allow, the derivative right might improve 
consumer welfare. One objection is that the most die-hard fans 
of Harry Potter will see and presumably benefit from all of the 
Harry Potter adaptations, and they may receive consumer sur-
plus well above the cost of admission. An objection on the flip 
side is that some of the viewers of the Troy P. Rather movie 
presumably would see this movie instead of other movies that 
would have made them almost equally happy. 
The answer to both objections is the same. At least as a 
general matter, the greater the extent to which a product has 
close economic substitutes, the less consumers will benefit from 
the introduction of the additional product. The percentage of 
viewers of the zillionth Harry Potter adaptation who would 
have been almost as happy with some other movie will proba-
bly be greater than the corresponding percentage of viewers of 
the first Troy P. Rather film. To be sure, this is not an inevita-
ble fact. Perhaps the Troy P. Rather movie, though involving a 
new character, will in fact be so unoriginal that it will have 
more close substitutes than the new Harry Potter adaptation. 
At least on average, however, adaptations will be closer eco-
nomic substitutes for one another than other works will be for 
one another. When a movie studio or other creator of copy-
righted works is choosing between two possible marginal 
works, if one work would be an adaptation of another work and 
the second work would not be, on average the adaptation will 
have closer economic substitutes than the nonadaptation. The 
two works might appear to promise roughly equal profit, but 
the adaptation is likely to reduce the profits of other works by 
more and have lesser social value. The derivative right pre-
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vents the creation of an unauthorized adaptation and steers 
creators of copyrighted content to more original, more socially 
valuable works. 
The possibility that copyright law might result in the pro-
duction of too many works has received considerable attention 
in recent years, as recognized by at least six different schol-
ars.12 My analysis in this Article, however, does not depend on 
the premise that there are too many copyrighted works. Even if 
we conclude that we have few copyrighted works overall, in the 
absence of the derivative right there might be excessive use of 
particular instances of copyrighted expression, such as popular 
fictional characters. The production of unauthorized derivatives 
may produce relatively little social value while steering crea-
tive resources from more original applications and causing the 
original author to rush official adaptations that will be lower 
quality than they otherwise would be. Authors may still au-
thorize a large number of adaptations. The derivative right, 
however, may prevent much greater redundancy at relatively 
little cost to free speech.13 
The derivative right to prepare sequels and adaptations, I 
will argue, is best understood not solely as a means of further-
ing the incentive to create works, but more significantly as a 
means of providing an author control over the release of adap-
tations and limiting the production of adaptations that would 
be close substitutes for one another. An important corollary to 
this explanation of the derivative right is that it may provide 
some justification for the long copyright term. The derivative 
right is just one of the rights of copyright, and the most impor-
tant right is the reproduction right, the exclusive right to pre-
pare copies of copyrighted works; it is this right that, at least in 
theory, prevents pirates from selling exact copies of copyrighted 
works without prior permission from the copyright owner. The 
derivative right increases in its importance relative to the re-
production right later in the copyright term, when fewer people 
will tend to be interested in the original work and more people 
will tend to be interested in sequels and other adaptations.14 
 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. I consider the free speech issue below but leave open the possibility 
that free speech might demand abolition of the derivative right even if this 
would have negative welfare consequences. See infra Part I.C. 
 14. I do not mean to suggest that the reproduction right lacks value late 
in the copyright term. Even an old movie might still make some money from 
DVD sales and perhaps even occasionally from a limited theatrical rerelease. 
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This Articles theory, unlike an incentive justification, could 
justify even retroactive extensions of the copyright term. At the 
least, preservation of the derivative right likely reflects the ac-
tual motivation of companies that sought the long copyright 
term. Of course, this Articles theory can contribute to a justifi-
cation only of a long copyright term for the derivative right. 
Perhaps the derivative right and the reproduction right, which 
have become essentially interchangeable in copyright doctrine, 
should be more clearly separated, and the copyright term 
should be longer for the derivative right than for the reproduc-
tion right. 
This seems unlikely in the near future, but the analytical 
exercise of distinguishing the derivative and reproduction 
rights could have immediate doctrinal benefits. By providing an 
economic foundation for the derivative right, borrowing from 
the rent dissipation literature that has proven analytically use-
ful in patent analysis, this Articles analysis points to a 
straightforward doctrinal test for the derivative right. This test 
focuses on competition among potential derivative works rather 
than on competition between such works and the original work. 
Even assuming the copyright term remains the same for both 
the derivative and the reproduction right, this test at least has 
the potential to resolve significant doctrinal confusion concern-
ing the derivative rights scope. At the same time, the Articles 
analysis suggests that a doctrinal test for the reproduction 
right should insist, as a prerequisite to protection, that there be 
some competition between the allegedly infringing work and 
the allegedly infringed work. By more clearly delineating the 
derivative from the reproduction right, we may avoid applica-
tions of each that fail to reflect the underlying purposes of 
these rights. 
Part I of this Article explains and questions the conven-
tional justification of the derivative right, that the right pro-
vides incentives to create copyrighted works. The derivative 
right probably greatly decreases the number of derivative 
works, and so the right is unlikely to maximize the total num-
 
Once a number of viewers have already experienced the original work, how-
ever, the proportion of value attributable to the reproduction right will decline. 
Suppose the copyright on a movie is initially worth $100 million, including $50 
million attributable to expected sales of the movie itself and $50 million at-
tributable to expected sales of sequels. After $40 million in tickets are sold, 
only $10 million of the remaining $60 million unrealized value of the movie 
copyright will be attributable to the reproduction right. 
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ber of works. The conventional argument can be salvaged, Part 
I argues, only by recognizing that some works may be more im-
portant than others, in part because works that are close sub-
stitutes for one another are of relatively little value. Part I also 
shows that copyrights reproduction right not only bans exact 
copying, but has been interpreted sufficiently broadly such that 
it substantially overlaps the derivative right. This Part con-
cludes by critiquing Jed Rubenfelds suggestion for differentiat-
ing the reproduction and derivative rights, an approach that 
would replace the derivative right with a liability rule. 
Part II reviews the recent literature applying product dif-
ferentiation theory to copyright and points to an additional 
area of the economic literature that may provide a more fruitful 
model for considering the derivative right. The copyright-and-
product-differentiation literature reveals that authors some-
times will have an incentive to create a work, thus entering a 
market for some genre of copyrighted works, even if the entry 
reduces social welfare. The intuition underlying this point is 
that the primary effect of some works will be to effect demand 
diversion, that is to divert consumers from other products from 
which they might have received almost as much utility, rather 
than to satisfy untapped demand. The insights of the literature 
so far have been applied to copyright in general, and the theory 
alone cannot tell us whether we have too many works or too 
few in total. 
The logic, however, may apply particularly forcefully to 
discrete submarkets in which there would be a large amount of 
demand diversion, as would be the case if no derivative right 
existed. Rent dissipation theory, which previously has proven 
useful for analyzing the dynamics of innovation in the patent 
system, also can serve as a useful vehicle for exploring the de-
rivative right. Rent dissipation theory relaxes two assumptions 
of the copyright-and-product-differentiation literature: that 
product space is of constant density, and that there are no races 
to place products in particular points in product space. Product 
space may become particularly crowded in some areas, and the 
derivative right will tend to even out the density of product 
space, resulting in fewer works exploiting the same expression 
and more relatively original works. The derivative right also 
eliminates copyright races to create adaptations, allowing the 
original author time to create a relatively high-quality work  
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and to build audience anticipation. Other doctrines, such as 
copyrights protection of characters and the long copyright 
term, also make more sense given this justification. 
Part III suggests doctrinal implications of the theory de-
veloped. Regardless of whether the derivative right in its cur-
rent form ultimately is normatively justified, the right needs a 
conceptual economic foundation to restrict its doctrinal con-
tours. The conventional justification of the derivative right, 
that it encourages production of new works, has no limiting 
principle. This Articles account, by contrast, casts the deriva-
tive right itself as the limiting principle to the general rule al-
lowing free entry into markets for copyrighted works. By clari-
fying that the danger against which the derivative right guards 
is not primarily reduction in authors incentives, the theory can 
counsel against applications of the derivative right that do not 
serve a significant economic function. In turn, by clarifying that 
the danger against which the reproduction right guards is re-
duction in authors incentives, the theory can counsel against 
applications of that right that do not advance such a goal. Part 
III thus offers a doctrinal approach for assessing the derivative 
and reproduction right, justifies that approach with attention 
to the wording of the Copyright Act itself, applies the test to 
some actual cases and other controversies, and comments on 
the related doctrine concerning the standard for copyrightabil-
ity of derivative works. 
I.  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT 
Under the Copyright Act, a copyright owner has, among 
rights, both the right to reproduce the copyrighted work in 
copies or phonorecords,15 and the right to prepare derivative 
works based upon the copyrighted work.16 The phrase deriva-
tive work is defined in the Acts definition section as follows: 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a transla-
tion, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, con-
densation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annota-
tions, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a derivative work.17 
 
 
 15. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (Supp. II 2002). 
 16. Id. § 106(2). 
 17. Id. § 101. 
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The definition thus leaves little doubt that a movie version of a 
book would be covered, and it is uncontroversial that a sequel 
to a book or movie similarly would count as a transformation or 
an adaptation.18 
In the vast majority of cases, the scope of these rights is 
clear, and many of the interesting questions concern whether 
someone can claim fair use in violating these rights.19 The de-
rivative right, however, does raise two important questions: 
First, what is its purpose? And second, how can it be distin-
guished from the reproduction right in cases in which the crea-
tion of an adaptation also involves the copying of some expres-
sion from the original work? Part I.A will argue that the classic 
defense of the derivative right, that it provides incentives to 
create new works, is at least overstated. Part I.B will note that 
the reproduction right has been interpreted to extend beyond 
exact reproductions and to overlap the derivative right sub-
stantially. The derivative rights breadth also demands some 
justification. 
A. THE PUZZLING DERIVATIVE RIGHT 
Commentators explain the derivative right with the same 
incentive rationale generally applied to justify copyright as a 
whole.20 Paul Goldstein, for example, uses Gone with the 
Wind21 to explain how the derivative right extends copyrights 
basic logic.22 Copyrights reproduction right provided Margaret 
 
 18. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274 
(11th Cir. 2001) (noting that a book sequel counts as a derivative work). 
 19. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (providing for a fair use defense); infra note 
81 and accompanying text (considering whether a parody is protected as a 
fair use). 
 20. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 409, 428 (2002) (The primary policy justification for copyright protection 
in the United States is the incentive justification.). The Supreme Court has 
recognized the need to provide incentives to create copyrighted works as justi-
fying the exclusive right. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that copyright is intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special re-
ward). The right cannot be unlimited, however, because of the need to ensure 
access to copyrighted works. See, e.g., id. (noting that the limited copyright 
term eventually ensures the public access to the products of their genius); see 
also Alireza Jay Naghavi & Gunther G. Schulze, Bootlegging in the Music In-
dustry: A Note, 12 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 57, 6263 (2001) (providing an economic 
explanation of the tension between static and dynamic efficiency in copyright). 
 21. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936). 
 22. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copy-
right, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY U.S.A. 209, 21617 (1983); see also PAUL GOLD-
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Mitchell and her publisher an incentive to invest time and 
money in writing, editing, producing and promoting the popu-
lar novel, . . . knowing that no one may copy the works expres-
sive content without their consent.23 In contrast, the derivative 
right enables prospective copyright owners to proportion their 
investment in a works expression to the returns expected not 
only from the market in which the copyrighted work is first 
published, but from other, derivative markets as well.24 
Mitchell and her publisher can hope to monopolize not only the 
sale of the novels hardcover and paperback editions, but also 
the use of the novels expressive elements in translations, mo-
tion pictures and countless other derivative formats.25 The 
copyright owners ability to exploit a copyrighted work not just 
through exclusive reproduction, but also through adaptation to 
various derivative formats, increases the potential returns from 
creation of a copyrighted work. The derivative right thus allows 
a prospective copyright owner to proportion . . . investment 
accordingly.26 
There are two ways that the derivative right might in-
crease investment in the creation of copyrighted works, though 
in each case the effects of the derivative right on investment 
may be small. First, the derivative right could lead someone 
who otherwise would not have created a copyrighted work to 
create one. For someone who is unsure of whether to write a 
book, the possibility of royalties from adaptations conceivably 
could be the decisive consideration. A problem with this expla-
nation is that revenues from adaptations ex ante may be far 
more significant for some works than others. The works most 
likely to be adaptedJohn Grisham novels, for example27are 
 
STEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (repeating the analysis). Gold-
steins choice of an example anticipates a later case, Suntrust Bank, that con-
sidered the circumstances in which the fair use doctrine can overcome the de-
rivative right, 268 F.3d at 1257. See infra note 80 and accompanying text 
(discussing this case in detail). 
 23. Goldstein, supra note 22, at 216. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. It is possible, of course, that Grisham would have written fewer books 
if he were able only to exploit the books themselves. Whether John Grisham 
would have produced fewer or more books if he received no compensation for 
movie rights depends on the balance of income and substitution effects. Cf. J. 
E. Stiglitz & P. Dasgupta, Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic 
Efficiency, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 151, 159 (1971) (claiming that income tax in-
creases sometimes lead workers to work more rather than less). In effect, the 
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likely to be so successful in and of themselves that they will be 
inframarginal works, i.e., works that would be produced any-
way, not works where financial factors make authors close to 
indifferent about whether to create them. Of course, sometimes 
works of which little is expected end up being bestsellers, and 
the fantasy of fame, fortune, and film adaptations may drive 
some yet unheralded writers.28 Publishers, moreover, may im-
plicitly factor in the possibility of revenues from derivative 
rights even where these revenues are unlikely; even if an au-
thor retains film rights, adaptation might increase sales of the 
original, perhaps explaining the lamentable practice of placing 
movie stills on the covers of books that have been adapted. In 
sum, derivative rights presumably do have some effect on the 
number of works created, but probably a large number of 
works, and especially a large number of the works most likely 
to be adapted, would be created even in the absence of deriva-
tive rights. 
Second, the derivative right might lead someone to invest 
more in a copyrighted work to preserve and maximize opportu-
nities for adaptation. Consider, for example, Laura Hillen-
brand, whose nonfiction best-seller Seabiscuit29 became a 
movie.30 Hillenbrand insists that in developing the initial book 
proposal for Seabiscuit, which was based in turn on an earlier 
article that she had written,31 the possibility of a movie never 
occurred to her,32 suggesting that she would have written the 
book even in the absence of the derivative right to film adapta-
 
existence of the derivative right increased Grishams revenues per book, and it 
is possible that Grisham might have made so much money from his first few 
works that he chose to allocate more time to leisure than he would have if he 
had made less money. The Grisham example, however, also suggests that if 
copyright law were suddenly to eliminate derivative rights, authors who have 
previously profited from them might no longer see it as worth their while to 
keep writing, as the expected royalties from subsequent works would be only a 
small percentage of royalties already received. 
 28. Markets for copyrighted works are sometimes described as winner-
take-all markets, in which the most successful contributors receive a high por-
tion of total profits. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-
TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 9 (1995) (Book publishing is a lottery of the purest sort, 
with a handful of best-selling authors receiving more than $10 million per 
book while armies of equally talented writers earn next to nothing.). 
 29. LAURA HILLENBRAND, SEABISCUIT: AN AMERICAN LEGEND (2001). 
 30. SEABISCUIT (Universal Studios 2003). 
 31. See Laura Hillenbrand, Four Good Legs Between Us, AM. HERITAGE, 
July/August, 1998, at 39. 
 32. See Michael Neff, An Interview with Laura Hillenbrand, WEB DEL 
SOL, 2002, http://webdelsol.com/f-SolPix.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). 
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tion. Hillenbrand, however, ended up with a movie contract be-
fore writing the book,33 and it is plausible to imagine that she 
devoted more time to researching and writing the book once she 
knew that the book would become a movie. Of course, Hillen-
brand would have had incentives to write a strong book in any 
event, so it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the effect. More 
generally, the derivative right may tend to steer investment of 
both time and money to works that are most likely to be 
adapted, potentially increasing the quality both of those works 
and of the adaptations as well. 
Though these effects are modest, if they were the only con-
sequences of the derivative right, the incentives case for the de-
rivative right would remain strong. The derivative right, how-
ever, can also decrease the number of new works by reducing 
the number of adaptations. If there were no derivative right, 
anyone could write a sequel to a book or adapt the book into a 
film, and we might end up with numerous adaptations rather 
than with just a small number. Uncopyrighted works often re-
sult in more adaptations than copyrighted works.34 While we 
cannot be sure how many movie versions of Harry Potter would 
exist in the absence of the derivative right, it seems plausible 
that there might be a fair number, and Harry Potter aficionados 
would argue about which movie was the best one. At least, it is 
certain that there would be many written adaptations of Harry 
Potter, as amateur authors presumably would create a large 
number of unauthorized sequels and adaptations to other cul-
tural contexts.35 
The incentives justification for the derivative right thus 
rests on an enthymematic and uncertain empirical claim, that 
the increase in the number and quality of original works that 
the derivative right effects more than offsets any decrease in 
the number of derivative works. That is possible, but there are 
reasons to think that it is unlikely. The derivative right pro-
vides only one factor in the calculus of a prospective writer of 
an original work, but it provides an absolute bar to creating 
and commercializing unauthorized adaptations. Even in the 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. See supra notes 15 and accompanying text. 
 35. A recent lawsuit charged a Russian author for creating an unauthor-
ized adaptation of Harry Potter and inserting him into a Russian cultural con-
text, even though the book did not use the name of Potter. See Russian Harry 
Potter Courts Trouble with JK Rowling, EVENING STANDARD (London), Nov. 7, 
2002, at 8, available at 2002 WLNR 3029707. 
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absence of an exclusive derivative right, authors of original 
works would have some ability to exploit derivative works, as-
suming that trademark law would prevent unauthorized 
adapters from passing off their derivative works as created by 
the authors of the original.36 The only reason that abolition of 
the derivative right would decrease authors incentives to cre-
ate original works is that others also would have incentives and 
ability to create adaptations. It thus seems unlikely that the 
derivative right encourages the creation of more works than it 
discourages.37 
In the absence of an empirical study refuting this logic, is 
there any way to salvage the incentives justification for the de-
rivative right? One approach might be to view the derivative 
right as a backup to the reproduction right. If the copyright 
holder did not hold an exclusive derivative right, then a would-
be copier would change just enough of the original work to en-
sure that the copying was beyond the scope of the reproduction 
right. If the reproduction right covered only literal copies and 
trivial variations, this defense of the reproduction right might 
seem sensible. But the reproduction right goes much further 
than this, covering even the borrowing of characters and plots, 
as we shall see in Part I.B. The reproduction right is thus so 
 
 36. In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. the Supreme 
Court held that federal trademark law does not prevent someone from distrib-
uting an uncopyrighted work without attribution. 539 U.S. 23, 39 (2003). The 
Courts rejection of this reverse passing off claim does not mean that trade-
mark law would countenance an attempt to make an unauthorized work ap-
pear to be an authorized work by the original author, which would constitute 
the more familiar act of passing off. See id. at 2728 (distinguishing reverse 
passing off  from passing off  under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(2000)). 
 37. I do not mean to imply that it is impossible for the eliminated incen-
tives to be greater than the new incentives. One possible story is of second-
mover advantages. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property 
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 70809 (2001) 
(explaining how second-mover advantages may provide a justification for pat-
ent protection). Imagine a world in which books are inherently money-losing 
ventures, but book sales help determine which books would make profitable 
movies. Books are thus in essence the first stage of investment toward devel-
opment of a movie. In the absence of a derivative right, no one would want to 
undertake this first stage, because if a book were successful, the producer of 
the book would not be able to capture the rents from production of the movie. 
In this world, the derivative right is essential to both the market for books and 
thus indirectly for movies adapted from books. Similar less extreme dynamics 
may well operate in real markets, but because many books are themselves 
profitable, this seems insufficient by itself to provide a defense of the deriva-
tive right. 
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expansive that it leaves little unprotected for the derivative 
right to back up. And even if the reproduction right were nar-
rowed, the derivative right extends considerably further than 
necessary to make it economically prohibitive for pirates to 
avoid liability by making modest changes to works. Moreover, if 
the concern were simply to solidify the reproduction right, the 
logical course would seem to be expansion of that doctrine, 
rather than creation of a new one. It is legitimate to be con-
cerned with discouraging the making of changes solely to avoid 
copyright liability,38 but this concern cannot save the incentives 
justification of the derivative right. 
An alternative approach to saving the incentives rationale 
might be to argue that although the derivative right may not 
result in copyright laws maximizing the number of works, it 
provides the strongest incentives for the most important works. 
Even if the incentives rationale results in the creation of only a 
few more original works, some of these works may result in the 
production of a large number of derivative works. The deriva-
tive right may prevent the production of many derivative 
works, but these derivative works will be of less importance, 
because they themselves will not likely lead to creation of many 
derivative works. An original work is more likely to lead to a 
derivative work than a derivative work is to lead to a second-
order derivative work. This explanation is closer to the correct 
one, but ultimately it is just a reformulation of the same em-
pirically tendentious claim. The argument equates importance 
with the total number of derivative works that will flow from a 
particular work, and any argument that a law constraining 
production of derivative works will increase the number of de-
rivative works at least demands some empirical support. In all 
likelihood, we could obtain more derivative works by eliminat-
ing the derivative right, because then prospective creators of 
derivative works rights would have a vastly greater number of 
works that they could adapt without authorization, even if 
there might be slightly fewer original works overall. 
To solidify the argument that the derivative right can be 
justified by the importance of the works that it encourages rela-
tive to those that it discourages, we must recognize that the 
relative importance of a work depends not solely on whether it 
will generate derivative works, but also on the extent to which 
it contributes value to consumers. This anticipates the analysis 
 
 38. See infra notes 7374 and accompanying text. 
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of Part II, that value to consumers depends on the extent to 
which a work has close market substitutes. If most consumers 
of a work alternatively would have consumed some other work 
or works that provided almost as much value, then the value of 
the new work is relatively low. The more redundant a copy-
righted work would likely be with other works, the stronger the 
case for copyright law to prevent the creation of that work by 
declaring it an infringement on an existing work. In general, 
derivative works will tend to be among the most redundant of 
works because they borrow not the ideas, but some aspect of 
the expression of the original works. Whether or not derivative 
works tend to be so redundant that they reduce consumer wel-
fare, copyright law may well maximize social welfare by incen-
tivizing a smaller number of original works rather than a lar-
ger number of derivative works. 
B. THE EXPANSIVE REPRODUCTION RIGHT 
Even in the absence of the derivative right, the reproduc-
tion right may be robust enough to discourage the most bla-
tantly redundant transformations. Perhaps the most surprising 
aspect of copyright law to the uninitiated is that individual 
components of works can enjoy independent copy protection 
that extends far beyond literal copying. At the beginning of the 
semester, students in my intellectual property law class gener-
ally believe that copyright law prevents them from copying mu-
sic cassette tapes or taping television shows,39 but they are 
skeptical of the possibility that copyright law might extend to 
protection of characters, plots, or themes. Perhaps those might 
receive protection under trademark, students who have a ru-
dimentary sense of the distinction between copyright and 
trademark might remark,40 but not under copyright. They may 
back down when asked whether a minor change to a word or a 
note is sufficient to escape a charge of copyright infringement, 
 
 39. It does not clearly prevent them from doing either of these things. See 
Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) (No action may be 
brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on . . . [a digi-
tal or analog audio recording device] or medium for making digital musical re-
cordings or analog musical recordings.); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 
464 U.S. 417, 45455 (1984) (finding time shifting by taping programs for 
later use on a Betamax not to violate fair use). 
 40. Indeed, there is substantial overlap between copyright and a variety of 
other doctrines in these areas. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeri-
tus: Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS 
L. REV. 429 (1994). 
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but only a bit. The savviest students, indeed, will suggest that 
while the law in considering infringement may not forgive an 
infringer who seeks to evade the law through minor modifica-
tions, that does not mean that an author can receive protection 
for characters, plots, or themes. These intuitions, however, are 
wrong. Although copyrightability will often be a close legal 
question, it is at least clear that copyright protection does ex-
tend beyond direct reproduction. 
Consider, for example, Anderson v. Stallone.41 The plaintiff 
wrote a thirty-one page outline for a possible Rocky IV.42 Unfor-
tunately, there was a Rocky IV,43 and even more unfortunately, 
it was quite similar to the plaintiff s proposal, but the plaintiff 
received no compensation.44 Sylvester Stallone tellingly did not 
defend on the ground that the plot outlined in the plaintiff s 
treatment was uncopyrightable. Instead, Stallone slyly argued 
that the outline was not entitled to copyright protection be-
cause it infringed Rocky Balboa and the other characters from 
the series.45 Stallone won this fight.46 More significantly, the 
strategy reflected what had long been clear, that characters are 
potentially the subject of protection. Judge Learned Hand rec-
ognized this in his famous opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pic-
tures Corp.,47 in which the principal allegation was that the 
plot infringed.48 Judge Hand found no infringement, but he did 
 
 41. No. 87-0592, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
 42. Id. at *1. 
 43. Really dont see ROCKY IV (United Artists 1985). 
 44. Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *12. 
 45. Id. at *56. Copyright cannot be obtained for any part of a work using 
preexisting material unlawfully. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) ([P]rotection for a 
work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not ex-
tend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlaw-
fully.). Although § 103(a) denies protection only to any part of the work con-
taining unauthorized material, it is broader than a refusal to extend copyright 
protection to the unauthorized material itself. A refusal of that nature would 
be redundant with § 103(b), which provides that copyright in a derivative work 
does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. Section 103(a) 
thus requires courts to determine the meaning of the word part. 
 46. Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *8. The critics concluded that Rocky IV 
was derivative. E.g., Almar Haflidason, Film Reviews: Rocky IV, BBC, Mar. 
12, 2001, http://www.bbc.co.uk/films/2000/06/11/rocky_iv_review.shtml ([T]his 
derivative and shallow sequel might weaken the credibility of the series . . . .). 
 47. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 48. The only matter common to the two, Judge Hand summarized, is a 
quarrel between a Jewish and an Irish father, the marriage of their children, 
the birth of grandchildren and a reconciliation. Id. at 122. That was not 
enough. 
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conclude that both plots and characters could infringe, noting 
for the latter that the less developed the characters, the less 
they can be copyrighted.49 
Protection of characters and plots is difficult to understand 
on any traditional rationale. If the plot of Rocky is a good one, 
why shouldnt we allow someone else to borrow that plot in an-
other context? If Balboa is an interesting character, then why 
shouldnt United Artistss competitors be allowed to use the 
character in their own movies? The best answer based on the 
incentive theory might be that there will be less investment in 
developing movies if third parties can steal the plots or charac-
ters in subsequent films. This seems specious, though, for the 
same reason that incentive justifications of the derivative right 
seem specious: any decrease in investment would probably at 
least be offset by the increase in investment in the derivative 
movies. An alternative theory might be that judges protect 
characters and plots based on some intuitive sense that reusing 
them amounts to misappropriation. But why does borrowing of 
characters and plots trouble some jurists, when other forms of 
borrowing and allusion do not? 
What may be more puzzling, however, is why the Stallone 
court relied on the theory that the Rocky characters are copy-
righted.50 The proposed sequel was unquestionably a derivative 
work, and the court indeed also justified its decision on this 
ground.51 As Jed Rubenfeld recently noted, Under present law, 
the copyright owners reproduction right (the exclusive right to 
reproduce) is viewed as already encompassing much of what 
would otherwise be covered by the derivative works right (the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works).52 It is not merely 
that the rights are overlapping, or that those who commit the 
sin of transformation cannot resist the sin of reproduction. 
Rather, the tests for violation of the derivative right and viola-
tion of the reproduction right are themselves almost redundant. 
When a violation of the derivative right occurs, the reproduc-
tion right is likely violated as well. Although courts sometimes 
 
 49. Id. at 121. 
 50. Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *78. 
 51. Id. at *8. 
 52. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyrights Constitution-
ality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 50 (2002). Rubenfeld adds, [I]ndeed, it has been 
claimed that the derivative works right, expansive though it might seem, is 
completely superfluous, commenting that the claim is an exaggeration, but a 
surprisingly modest one. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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will return to the statutory definitions of the exclusive rights,53 
substantial similarity has emerged as an element of the in-
fringement inquiry for alleged violations of both the reproduc-
tion right and the derivative right.54 A violation of the deriva-
tive right will almost automatically entail a violation of the 
reproduction right, because a derivative work will borrow some 
aspect of the original, and that aspect will be independently 
copyrightable. 
In part, the similarity in definitions of the reproduction 
right and the derivative right may reflect that courts often 
simply do not have to distinguish them. A litigant simply does 
not care whether the basis for an infringement finding is the 
violation of one right or the other. There may, however, be a 
deeper explanation, which is that the justification for the re-
production right and the derivative right has essentially been 
the same, maximizing incentives to produce new works. With-
out identification of separate purposes for the two rights, the 
courts have no theoretical foundation for distinguishing them. 
A doctrine that distinguishes the rights more clearly would be 
useful, in part because there are rare cases in which one right 
but not the other is implicated. This may occur, for example, 
when reproduction of a work has been authorized or is pro-
tected by fair use, but creation of a derivative work has not 
been.55 More importantly, the near congruence of the defini-
tions suggests that the current approach may be inadequate for 
both rights, because it indicates that copyright doctrine has 
failed to appreciate the distinctive nature of each, and therefore 
an alternative definition may be needed.  
C. RUBENFELDS APPROACH 
I am not the only commentator to suggest that copyright 
law might distinguish more clearly between the reproduction 
and derivative rights. Professor Rubenfeld has made a similar 
proposal,56 although his motive could not be more different. 
This Articles project is to justify a relatively strong derivative 
 
 53. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. II 2002). 
 54. See, e.g., Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Intl. Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 
117 (2d Cir. 2003) (following an earlier case that the court characterized as 
drawing no distinction between the two forms of infringement, and noting 
that the substantially similar test applied to both forms of infringement). 
 55. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 56. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 5052. 
ABRAMOWICZ_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:49:18 AM 
336 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:317 
 
right,57 while questioning the breadth of the reproduction right. 
Rubenfeld, by contrast, is particularly concerned about the de-
rivative right and neither endorses nor questions copyrights 
reproduction right. A consideration of Rubenfelds analysis will 
be useful for two reasons. First, it will provide an opportunity 
to consider the most prominent attack on the derivative right, 
as Rubenfeld is one of few scholars to pay the derivative right 
sustained attention.58 Second, it will allow for an examination 
of Rubenfelds doctrinal proposal as a prelude to my own sug-
gested formulation of a derivative works test. 
Rubenfelds approach to copyright follows from a broader 
theory of the First Amendment. Rubenfelds starting point is 
his observation that the First Amendments protection of art59 
cannot be explained by [g]iant-sized First Amendment theo-
ries based on some theory of either democracy or expressive 
autonomy.60 Art has too small of an influence on the formation 
of political opinion for democratic theories to explain it,61 and 
an expressive autonomy view fails to account for the signifi-
cance of the right to view art.62 Rubenfelds alternative is to 
 
 57. I say relatively strong because my approach would impose meaning-
ful limits on the right. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 58. For another thoughtful critique of the derivative right, see Naomi Abe 
Voegtli, Note, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213 (1997). 
Voegtli argues that appropriation historically has been important in art and 
other expressive activities, and that the derivative right inhibits it. Id. at 
1216. Although my primary ambition is to defend the breadth of the derivative 
right, I reach similar conclusions to Voegtli on some issues, such as sound 
sampling. See id. at 122126; infra Part III.B.2. 
 59. E.g., Natl Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) 
(It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within this First Amend-
ment protection.); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group 
of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (indicating that literature and arts 
are unquestionably shielded by the First Amendment); Martin H. Redish, 
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 60104 (1982) (discussing 
First Amendment protection of art). 
 60. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 30. 
 61. Compare Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 25657 (arguing that literature and art help voters 
acquire knowledge, intelligence, and sensitivity to human values, all of 
which contribute to decisions at the ballot box), with Rubenfeld, supra note 52, 
at 33 (Suppose someone said that prayer contributes to the formation of po-
litical opinion. This statement . . . would exaggerate prayers political signifi-
cance while instrumentalizing it, making it carry democracys water.). 
 62. Rubenfeld recognizes that [e]xpression requires an expressee as well 
as an expresser, but he complains that [t]he self-expression view of art comes 
to audience rights as a derivative thing, a kind of logical necessity implied sec-
ondarily if we are going to give artists the freedom to which they are entitled. 
Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 34. 
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propose that the First Amendment protects a freedom of 
imagination,63 which includes the freedom to explore the 
world not present, creatively and communicatively.64 This 
reconceptualization, Rubenfeld argues, both explains the pro-
tection of art and reflects the foundational point that state ac-
tors cannot jail a person for holding the wrong political opinion 
or for believing in the wrong god.65 
Rubenfelds endorsement of the freedom of imagination, 
however, is subject to the same criticism that he levied at ex-
pressive autonomy theories,66 that the freedom is one of the au-
thor rather than of the consumer of expressive works. Perhaps 
anticipating this, Rubenfeld insists that the communication of 
imagination is central to the freedom of imagination,67 but he 
does not explain why we should accept this view while rejecting 
the views of those who insist that the right to have a listener is 
essential to expressive autonomy. I make this criticism not to 
attack Rubenfelds constitutional theory, which is beyond my 
scope here, but to identify the fundamental difficulty in apply-
ing it. The question is to what extent the law must protect 
communication of imagination to honor the broader First 
Amendment freedom. Rubenfelds answer is that [i]f the al-
leged harms that the state seeks to redress by prohibiting or 
prosecuting the conduct in question can be fully, persuasively 
explained without any reference to anything the person com-
municated through that conduct, then the person is not pun-
ished for speaking.68 A creative murderer thus cannot escape 
prosecution, because to prosecute him is not to punish him for 
what he dared to imagine.69 
This explanation, however, cannot adequately distinguish 
the reproduction right from the derivative right, because if the 
reproduction right is not to be easily evaded, the courts must 
consider the content of allegedly infringing works that are not 
identical to the originals. [N]ot just any change in the original 
work should suffice to evade the copyright holders reproduc- 
 
 
 63. Id. at 3743. 
 64. Id. at 38. 
 65. Id. at 39. 
 66. Id. at 3335. 
 67. Id. at 42. 
 68. Id. at 41. 
 69. Id. at 42. 
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tion right, Rubenfeld acknowledges.70 Trivial or obvious modi-
fications, or changes that involve no substantially new act of 
imagination, especially if introduced to evade the reproduction 
right, should not qualify.71 This threshold, however, is so low 
that courts either would have to inquire into motive72 or allow 
works with only relatively modest injections of originality to 
qualify as derivative works. Rubenfeld takes the latter ap-
proach, recommending that copyright import into the definition 
of derivative works the separate case law concerning when a 
derivative work is sufficiently original to qualify for its own 
copyright.73 The required quantum of creativity is not large, 
Rubenfeld notes, adding that any substantial or distinguish-
able variation from the preexisting work will be sufficient.74 
This test, however, cannot be squared with Rubenfelds 
concern about trivial or obvious modifications if triviality is to 
be measured against the work as a whole.75 Consider, for ex-
ample, a version of Gone with the Wind in which a paragraph 
or a chapter was replaced with an alternative. Such a change 
surely would involve an act of imagination, and a paragraph or 
chapter can be sufficiently long to merit independent copyright 
protection, yet it seems inconceivable that copyright law would 
or should tolerate distribution of such a work.76 Under 
Rubenfelds approach, even very minor substantive changes, as 
long as they are not trivial, would entitle a work to derivative 
status, and thus under his proposal, to exemption from the re-
production right.77 This is an absolutist position, an insistence 
 
 70. Id. at 55. 
 71. Id. 
 72. In other writing, Rubenfeld has shown sympathy for judicial consid-
eration of motives. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 
427, 45254 (1997) (justifying the school desegregation cases on the ground 
that the purpose, and not merely the effect, of the statutes was to degrade 
black people). 
 73. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 5355. This standard is usually viewed 
as quite low. See infra Part III.C. 
 74. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 55 (citing cases allowing relatively small 
variations to be sufficient, including Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publg Co., 
158 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1998); and Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Lit-
tle, 51 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. One could imagine a copyright law that would tolerate distribution of 
the new portions alone, along with indications of what text they should re-
place. But Rubenfeld wisely does not suggest this caveat and thus appears to 
envision incorporation of expression into transformative works. 
 77. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 55. 
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that copyright law cannot block the use of a large amount of  
previous authors expression to support a relatively modest ex-
ercise of imagination. 
This criticism might seem a picky quibble about where to 
draw the constitutional line, but the objection is not a minor 
one, for if Rubenfeld does not take his absolutist position, he 
can offer no conclusive attack on the current state of the de-
rivative right. Once we accept that it is sometimes proper to 
limit use of preexisting expression, then we need some rule de-
termining just how much of previous authors expression can be 
copied in works that independently display imagination. Copy-
right law draws such a line, allowing authors to use without 
authorization the ideas but not the expression of their prede-
cessors.78 Perhaps this is not the best line. Admittedly, it is no-
toriously imprecise.79 But creating a more precise test, or a 
narrower but still not absolutist test, would require consider-
able effort. Moreover, the idea-expression dichotomy does pay 
some attention to the freedom of imagination. It allows anyone 
to exercise imagination as long as she does so without using 
others expression. No unauthorized party can distribute books 
containing alternative endings to Gone with the Wind,80 but an 
author could express the same underlying ideas using different 
sets of characters. In addition, an author would remain free to 
criticize the original either directly or in a parody meeting the 
requirements of the fair use test.81 
 
 78. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Works Total Concept and 
Feel, 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 39596 (1989) (noting that courts have found the 
idea/expression dichotomy to justify copyright law under the First Amend-
ment, but questioning whether the distinction is adequate to ensure copy-
rights constitutionality). 
 79. As Judge Hand noted in developing the abstractions test for distin-
guishing ideas from expression, [n]obody has ever been able to fix that bound-
ary, and nobody ever can. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 
121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 80. See Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 
1384 (N.D. Ga. 2001), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), 
order vacated and opinion substituted, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (When 
the reader of Gone with the Wind turns over the last page, he may well wonder 
what becomes of Ms. Mitchells beloved characters and their romantic, but 
tragic, world. . . . The right to answer those questions . . . legally belongs to 
Ms. Mitchells heirs . . . .), quoted in Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 54. 
 81. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994) 
(holding that parody may be protected as fair use). Rubenfeld argues that fair 
use cannot save the derivative right: No court in the United States should 
need to wrestle through a set of complicated statutory factors (the factors of 
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In the end, I cannot say whether the First Amendment 
concern with the freedom of imagination is so weighty as to 
render the existing regime inadequate. How to weigh the free-
dom of imagination with the Constitutions encouragement of 
copyright depends on historical, value-laden, and empirical con-
cerns. Rubenfeld suggests that economic factors should neces-
sarily yield to constitutional concerns. Although economic in-
terests and speech interests often may be aligned, because 
speech has economic value, Rubenfeld observes that the First 
Amendment would and should strike down a ban on speech, 
even if that ban were thought likely to maximize the amount of 
speech produced overall.82 
Absolutism, however, is not the prevailing approach in 
First Amendment jurisprudence,83 and given the Constitutions 
grant of the copyright power, economic concerns seem at least 
tangentially relevant to the constitutional analysis. Perhaps 
anticipating this, Rubenfeld suggests an administrative scheme 
that he seems to believe would allow the freedom of imagina-
tion to exist without undue economic repercussions. Rather 
than allow free licenses to create derivative works, Rubenfeld 
suggests that a copyright holder would have an action for 
profit allocation.84 Though Rubenfeld does not explain just 
 
the fair use defense) before deciding whether to suppress a book like The Wind 
Done Gone. We dont suppress books in this country. Rubenfeld, supra note 
52, at 54. Rubenfeld, however, does not justify the premise that the complexity 
of copyright law itself constitutes a First Amendment violation. If copyright 
law creates a satisfactory line between permitted and prohibited uses of oth-
ers expression, it should not matter that this line arises from the interaction 
of doctrine concerning the idea-expression dichotomy with the fair use test. 
Rubenfeld may believe that the parody exception may not be broad enough, a 
concern that I share. But if that is so, his criticism should be directed at fair 
use, not at the derivative right. 
 82. Rubenfeld invokes a slippery slope argument against the position that 
the First Amendment should seek to maximize the amount of speech: 
Perhaps offensive speech and copyright infringement really do have a 
silencing effect, ultimately producing less speech overall. Come to 
think of it, perhaps a knockdown argument is also silencing . . . . Are 
we to understand that a person can be jailed for making too good an 
argument against copyright law, an argument so good it brings de-
bate to an end, leaving its audience with little or nothing to say? 
Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 2223 (emphasis omitted). 
 83. See, e.g., Solveig Singleton, Reviving a First Amendment Absolutism 
for the Internet, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279, 280 (1999) ([T]he First Amend-
ment doctrine associated with Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Hugo 
Black known as First Amendment absolutism is presently unfashionable. 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 84. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 55 (emphasis omitted). 
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how profits would be allocated,85 he argues that such an action 
leaves the author [of a derivative work] no worse off than he 
would have been had he chosen not to commercialize the de-
rivative work.86 Such an author, after all, could choose to of-
fer[] the work for free.87 
Rubenfeld is presumably correct that derivative work au-
thors would be no worse off under his approach than under the 
current regime, but authors who might make derivative works 
of their own may be considerably worse off. Ordinarily, such 
authors will be willing to sell the right to create derivative 
works at some price, and so Rubenfelds regime will make a dif-
ference only when the profit allocation adjudication can be ex-
pected to allow use at some lower price. Rubenfeld purports to 
offer no policy defense of the profit allocation scheme,88 but his 
approach effectively strikes a compromise between the current 
derivative right and a regime with no derivative right at all, 
and the degree of compromise would depend on the mecha-
nisms of the profit allocation approach.89 Even if we assume 
that there is some feasible way of apportioning profits based on 
the degree of contribution, we must still ask whether social wel-
fare would be increased by decreasing an authors control over 
the creation of adaptations, resulting in copyright races and a 
 
 85. As Rubenfeld recognizes, Apportioning profits in such cases would 
not be an obvious proposition; the share of profits owing to the original author 
might be very considerable. Id. at 58. 
 86. Id. at 57. 
 87. Id. Allowing authors to exercise their imagination but not commercial-
ize the results (in the sense of themselves profiting from the expression result-
ing from the imagination) would be one means of vindicating the freedom of 
imagination without abolishing the derivative right. A profit allocation suit 
would not be necessary; copyright law could simply provide that the author of 
an unauthorized derivative work is not liable for damages, but forfeits the re-
production right for that work. Even with such an approach, however, copy-
right law would need to ensure that the derivative works do not violate the 
original works reproduction right, properly, but not trivially conceived. 
 88. Id. at 5859 (I make no claim about whether this result would be 
good or bad policy. The result is not supposed to follow from policy considera-
tions. It is supposed to follow from constitutional considera-
tions . . . . [C]opyrights act as prior restraints.). 
 89. It is thus possible that the profit allocation approach might demand so 
much in payment that it would make no difference at all. A liability rule can 
function like a property rule if liability for taking property is sufficiently high. 
See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordi-
nary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1317 (1990) (offering a model in 
which supercompensatory damages define the difference between a property 
rule and a liability rule). If payments are trivial, on the other hand, then the 
profit allocation approach amounts to elimination of the derivative right. 
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greater number of derivative works being created. The answer 
is empirical, but the next part explains why elimination of the 
derivative right might reduce social welfare. 
II.  A RENT DISSIPATION THEORY OF  
THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT 
Although the economics of product differentiation are com-
plex, there is a simple underlying idea that is relevant to a con-
sideration of redundancy of copyrighted works, that of demand 
diversion or business stealing. Part II.A will review the recent 
literature noting the existence of this possibility and describing 
the countervailing forces that act against overentry. Part II.B 
describes an alternative theoretical framework for understand-
ing copyright redundancy, and that is the phenomenon of rent-
dissipating races by private parties. Not only does this frame-
work provide an intuitive basis for applying the core theoretical 
insight of the copyright-and-product-differentiation literature, 
but it also emphasizes two key theoretical points: first, that 
product space may be more crowded in some areas than others; 
second, competing authors of derivative works might aim for 
roughly the same spot in product space at the same time, pro-
ducing inefficiencies associated with racing. After reviewing the 
literature on rent dissipation in other areas of law, this Part 
will imagine a hypothetical copyright regime with a stronger 
derivative right. This hypothetical regime would limit rent dis-
sipation, but it would introduce other problems and concerns, 
particularly about freedom of speech. Finally, Part II.C will use 
the rent dissipation approach to offer a renewed assessment of 
the derivative right, the reproduction right, and the copyright 
term. 
A. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION THEORY 
In models of competitive markets, goods are often assumed 
to be homogeneous.90 This model is effective for commodities 
like wheat, and for many products sold monopolistically, such 
as electricity, but many consumer products are differentiated. 
Restaurants all serve food, but they may serve different types 
of food, with appropriate or inappropriate decor, and varying 
levels of quality and service. And while books all share some- 
 
 
 90. See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 8788 (3d ed. 
1966) (defining perfect competition). 
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thing in common, they describe different subjects and tell their 
stories in different ways. Markets for books and other copy-
righted works, like markets for restaurants, are thus markets 
for differentiated products. Economists analyze such markets 
with a framework called imperfect competition,91 relaxing 
(among other assumptions) the assumption of perfect competi-
tion models that competing goods are homogeneous. This im-
perfect competition framework has spawned a literature on 
product differentiation that considers, among other questions, 
the welfare effects of producer entry into imperfectly competi-
tive markets.92 
Although the literature on product differentiation was well 
developed by the end of the twentieth century, it received no at-
tention in the copyright literature until recently. In 2001, Mi-
chael Meurer noted the possibility of production of redundant 
copyrighted works in a brief discussion in an article on price 
discrimination in markets for copyrighted works.93 [M]ultiple 
producers, Meurer observed, sometimes race to get to the 
market first with essentially duplicative works.94 Excessive 
entry into a market is particularly dangerous when there are 
close substitutes for a new . . . [p]roduct in a market niche al-
ready crowded with other similar products.95 The possibility of 
excessive production of copyrighted works was relevant for 
Meurers project because Meurer was evaluating an argument 
that price discrimination by copyright owners is welfare in-
creasing, allowing copyright owners to obtain greater profits 
and thus inducing them to produce more works. As Meurer cor-
rectly observed, we cannot assume that more is necessarily  
 
 
 91. For a significant early article, see, Edward H. Chamberlin, Monopolis-
tic or Imperfect Competition?, 51 Q.J. ECON. 557, 566 (1937). For an overview, 
see generally JAN KEPPLER, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY: ORIGINS, 
RESULTS, AND IMPLICATIONS (1994). 
 92. For some extended treatments, see generally SIMON P. ANDERSON ET 
AL., DISCRETE CHOICE THEORY OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION (1992); JOHN 
BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRODUCT DIF-
FERENTIATION (1991); and 12 THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIA-
TION (Jacques Francois Thisse & George Norman eds., 1994). 
 93. Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 55, 9697 (2001). For an article that touches on the possibility 
that there might be an excessive number of content producers, though not 
necessarily an excessive amount of content, see C. Edwin Baker, Giving the 
Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 33940 (1997). 
 94. Meurer, supra note 93, at 97. 
 95. Id. 
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merrier in markets for copyrighted works, and therefore it is 
not clear whether doctrine encouraging price discrimination 
raises social welfare by increasing incentives to produce new 
works.96 
Though made to evaluate copyrights treatment of price 
discrimination, Meurers point about the value of incentives has 
broader resonance, potentially applying to any copyright issue 
that might affect incentives to produce copyrighted works, and 
possibly to areas besides copyright. Indeed, in a 2002 article, 
Richard Markovits argued that a range of governmental poli-
cies might produce excessive research expenditures.97 Mark-
ovits distinguished two types of such expenditure: production-
process research, designed to decrease the cost of producing 
goods, and quality-and-variety investments, designed to in-
crease the quality and variety of products.98 Markovits argued 
that we may have too little of the former and too much of the 
latter.99 Although Markovitss analysis took into account some 
factors not explicitly considered by Meurer, such as the effects 
of monopoly distortions, the central insight was similar, that 
marginal investments in improving product quality and variety 
withdraw resources from other projects.100 If the social benefits 
of the improvements are small, then the social costs of such re-
search may exceed the benefits. Markovits concluded his dis-
cussion with a two-page analysis of intellectual property law, 
noting the possibility that broadening . . . copyright protection 
will increase misallocation by increasing the allocative exces-
siveness of the investments we make in the relevant types of 
. . . artistic creation.101 
To see concretely how copyright law might produce exces-
sive entry incentives, consider the following example. Suppose 
that you are the author of the worlds only vegetarian cookbook, 
and if no one enters the market, your future profits, in expected 
value terms, will be $100,000. Let us suppose that I am consid-
ering writing another cookbook, different enough for purposes 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to In-
crease Research and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intel-
lectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 63, 6769 (2002). 
 98. Id. at 6869. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 80. 
 101. Id. at 118. 
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of copyright law, but similar enough so that no consumer would 
ever care to buy both cookbooks, and so that all consumers es-
sentially would be indifferent between the two. If I expect that 
my entry will not affect the price of cookbooks, then I would be 
willing to spend up to $50,000 (including the opportunity cost of 
my time) to take away half of your market and half of the ex-
pected profits. From a social perspective, my $50,000 invest-
ment is wasteful, with no consumer benefiting and another 
producer $50,000 worse off, a loss that the literature refers to 
as demand diversion or business stealing.102 Society would 
be better off if I had put this investment to alternative uses, for 
example by becoming a cook instead of a cookbook writer. 
This is a stylized example, because in real markets, there 
are more works in any given subgenre and each work is suffi-
ciently different from every other such that no two works are 
perfect substitutes. There are, however, more elaborate models 
that can produce the same result. Steven Salop, for example, 
created a model in which different firms located around a cir-
cle.103 The circle represented the geographical space analogue 
of product space, and Salops model recognized that larger 
numbers of firms would reduce both prices and the transport 
costs that consumers bear when there is no product that ex-
actly matches what they want.104 Under fairly general assump-
tions,105 Salop showed that twice as many firms enter the mar-
ket as is socially optimal because each entrant does not take 
into account that entry will harm rivals.106 Salops analysis, 
however, provided just one way of modeling product diversity, 
and in other models, overentry is less likely to occur.107 
 
 
 102. See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and 
Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND. J. ECON. 48, 49 (1986). 
 103. Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 
BELL J. ECON. 141, 14344 (1979). 
 104. See id. at 144. 
 105. Though Salops assumptions given the circular model are general, 
Salop acknowledged that the circular model itself may not be robust to alter-
native specifications. Id. at 156. 
 106. See id. at 152. 
 107. See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competi-
tion and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 299300 (1977). 
For a critique of the Dixit-Stiglitz approach, see John S. Pettengill, Monopolis-
tic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Comment, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 
957 (1979), and for a response to the critique, see Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph 
E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Reply, 
69 AM. ECON. REV. 961 (1979). 
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Recognizing this complexity, in An Industrial Organization 
Approach to Copyright Law, I established an analytical founda-
tion for the present project by explaining product differentia-
tion theorys relevance for copyright laws incentives-access 
paradigm,108 the oft-noted trade-off between increasing incen-
tives to produce new works and access to existing works.109 If 
there is excessive production of copyrighted works, then there 
is no trade-off from a social welfare perspective. My intent, 
however, was not to suggest that there indeed was excessive 
production, but rather to note that even if production incentives 
are the paramount goal of copyright law, such incentives are 
less important at the margin and that policies producing slight 
decreases in the number of works produced might nonetheless 
be welfare increasing. The article includes a simulation model 
suggesting that markets for copyrighted works might have ex-
cessive or inadequate investment, but that either way, under 
certain conditions increasing access to copyrighted works by al-
lowing greater noncommercial copying could increase social 
welfare.110 The analysis thus strengthens the case for placing 
considerable weight in the policy calculus on access to existing 
copyrighted works, for example making legalization of peer-to-
peer file-sharing seem more attractive than it otherwise might 
appear.111 
Reinforcing the observation that product space can be 
crowded, Christopher Yoo apparently observed the connection 
between copyright and product differentiation at about the 
same time as I did, and indeed he won the copyright race by 
publishing his article first.112 Yoos thesis is that the product 
differentiation literature helps to explain several puzzles aris-
ing from theories treating copyrighted works as public goods, 
which imply that copyrighted works should sell at constant 
marginal cost and that markets for copyrighted works should 
exhibit natural monopoly properties.113 Yoo also notes that de-
mand diversion could lead to production of an excessive number 
of copyrighted works, but, like me, he recognizes that such a 
 
 108. See Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to 
Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33 (2004). 
 109. See generally Lunney, supra note 11 (discussing the trade-off). 
 110. See Abramowicz, supra note 108, at app. 
 111. See id. at 97103. 
 112. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004). 
 113. Id. at 23134, 24651. 
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result is not inevitable.114 Both Yoos analysis and my previous 
analysis recognize that copyrighted works may be substitutes 
for one another and thus imply that copyright redundancy may 
have benefits and costs for consumers.115 
The product differentiation literature ultimately can serve 
as only a preliminary model of copyright markets, however, for 
at least two reasons. First, the literature fails to take into ac-
count the variable density of product space. The product differ-
entiation approach is difficult to apply to concrete doctrinal 
problems because every copyrighted work faces a different set 
of substitutes, and even identifying that set of substitutes 
proves to be a complicated problem.116 Even if we have too few 
works overall, and indeed even if we have the optimal number 
or too few derivative works, it remains possible that if we 
eliminated the derivative right, we would have too many. We 
therefore must consider not copyright markets as a whole, but 
specifically the competition that would exist in the absence of 
the derivative right between the original author and the au-
thors of unauthorized derivatives, as well as among the authors 
of unauthorized derivatives. Rent dissipation theory will pro-
vide an approach that allows more direct focus on such compe-
tition, in an analytically more tractable framework. 
Second, the product differentiation literature fails to take 
into account the dynamics of the process through which pro-
spective copyright owners situate their works in product space. 
Salops model assumes that different producers simultaneously 
situate themselves, evenly spaced, in product space.117 Other 
models allow for sequential positioning in product space,118 but 
this too is unrealistic. In the absence of the derivative right, ri-
val exploiters of a single work would not queue up, each wait-
ing for the last to finish work before proceeding. To the con-
trary, rivals might well seek to aim for approximately the same 
point in product space, and because being first matters in copy-
 
 114. Id. at 26064. 
 115. See id. at 27172; supra note 108, at 37. 
 116. See generally Shubha Ghosh, Rights of First Entry in Derivative 
Markets: Exploring Market Definition in Copyright (Aug. 8, 2003) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (considering the implication of the 
product differentiation literature for derivative works). 
 117. Salop, supra note 103, at 144. 
 118. See, e.g., Jonathan Eaton & Henryk Kierzkowski, Oligopolistic Compe-
tition, Product Variety, Entry Deterrence, and Technology Transfer, 15 RAND J. 
ECON. 99, 99 (1984) (offering a model in which entry by one producer may de-
ter entry by others). 
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right markets, the rivals might make decisions about how 
much time to invest in improving their copyrighted works 
based in part on their anticipation of rivals progress. Rent dis-
sipation theory has previously shed light on the welfare impli-
cations of patent races,119 and it can do the same for copyright 
races. 
B. RENT DISSIPATION THEORY 
1. An Introduction to Rent Dissipation 
Economic rents are returns in excess of the opportunity 
cost of specific resources, and quasi rents are returns in ex-
cess of the short-run opportunity cost of resources.120 To the 
extent that a copyright owner earns a profit that will vanish 
once competitors enter the relevant market by creating substi-
tute works, the profit is a quasi rent. Because entrants are 
seeking a portion of existing rents, the activities they under-
take to enter the market are called rent seeking, and the ten-
dency of entry costs to reduce rents is called rent dissipa-
tion.121 Rent-seeking activity is not inherently inefficient. All 
those who create works for profit are rent seeking, but their ac-
tivity may nonetheless increase social welfare, as new creative 
works increase consumer surplus. The rent dissipation litera-
ture makes clear, however, that rent-seeking activity can re-
duce social welfare.122 In the copyright context, this is particu-
larly likely whenever many new entrants are close substitutes 
for one another, as would be the case in the absence of the de-
rivative right. 
The most familiar example of rent seeking in the legal and 
public-choice literatures is the lobbying of public officials to se-
cure a private monopoly,123 a source of inefficiency that may 
even exceed the deadweight loss associated with monopoly pric-
 
 119. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 120. E.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 n.2 (1986). 
 121. For an excellent discussion of rent seeking and rent dissipation, see 
Aditya Bamzai, Comment, The Wasteful Duplication Thesis in Natural Mo-
nopoly Regulation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1525, 153440 (2004). 
 122. The seminal works identifying the potential welfare-reducing conse-
quences of rent seeking are Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the 
Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974), and Gordon Tullock, The 
Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). 
 123. See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 122, at 29293. 
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ing.124 Any investment by a private party to capture rents, pro-
tect rents, or take rents enjoyed by another party can constitute 
rent seeking, however.125 An example not involving lobbying is 
that of the gold rush.126 Suppose that I have found a gold mine 
worth $100,000, but because of an absence of property rights, 
anyone who is willing to pay $1000 for equipment can get an 
equal share of the mines gold at no further cost. Then, 100 
people will enter, for a total fixed cost of $100,000. Society is 
thus no better off than if the gold mine had never been found, 
as the rents that I would have earned if I were able to remove 
all the gold myself are dissipated away. A similar example is 
that of a valuable shipwreck.127 When anyone can salvage the 
ship, the societal investments to find it will approach the value 
of the ship. If the social investments equal the value, even if 
the party to reach the ship is allowed to keep it in its entirety, 
society as a whole is no better off than if the treasure had never 
even existed.128 
Competition, however, may not entirely dissipate a rent, 
for several reasons. First, if some of the participants are risk 
averse, as behavioral economics would predict at least when 
individuals are racing to capture a gain rather than avoid a 
loss,129 then the total investment in the search will be less than 
the prize.130 Second, because rent dissipation reflects in part 
 
 124. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 
83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 807 (1975). 
 125. A related expense is rent defending, where individuals seek to prevent 
the rent-seeking activities of others. See, e.g., John T. Wenders, On Perfect 
Rent Dissipation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 456, 45658 (1987). 
 126. For a study of how emerging property rights helped prevent rent dis-
sipation during the California gold rush, see John Umbeck, The California 
Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights, 14 EXPLORATIONS ECON. 
HIST. 197 (1977). For an explanation of how rent dissipation may occur with 
any nonexclusive resource, see Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Con-
tract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 5864 
(1970). 
 127. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (5th ed. 1998). 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1, 2022 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tver-
sky eds., 2000) (summarizing experimental evidence indicating that individu-
als are generally risk averse as to gains and risk seeking as to losses); Chris 
Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 163, 17681 (2000) (explaining that prospect theory in the litigation con-
text shows that choices between gains induces risk aversion, and choices be-
tween losses encourages risk seeking). 
 130. See generally Arye L. Hillman & Eliakim Katz, Risk-Averse Rent Seek-
ers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power, 94 ECON. J. 104 (1984) (offering a 
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opportunity costs, a rent will be entirely dissipated only if each 
participant is indifferent between participating in the activity 
and in some other activity.131 Third, if the parties are not iden-
tically situated, rent dissipation may be reduced or elimi-
nated.132 To take an extreme example, if it is apparent that, re-
gardless of the efforts of others, one party will definitely arrive 
first and capture all of the gold, then no one else will enter the 
race.133 Fourth, rent-dissipating races can lead to earlier 
achievement of a goal, resulting in an end to rent-dissipating 
activities.134 Fifth, rent dissipation may produce third-party 
benefits. Those participating in the California Gold Rush may 
have provided positive externalities to other settlers of Califor-
nia, and treasure hunts may result in benefits to archaeolo-
gists.135 
These caveats suggest that in real-world settings, rent dis-
sipation will be incomplete. Perhaps the most significant factor 
reducing rent dissipation, however, is property rights. If, for 
example, the law specifies that a unique party has the rights to 
a sunken vessel,136 then no one else will enter, thus entirely 
avoiding the rent-dissipating race. The owner of the vessel then 
 
careful analysis on the effect of risk aversion on rent dissipation). 
 131. Id. at 104 ([B]ecause of intrinsic second-best considerations[,] re-
sources used in rent seeking may not have positive shadow prices, implying 
that individuals quests to secure biddable rents need not always entail so-
cially wasteful activity.). 
 132. See, e.g., Christopher Harris & John Vickers, Perfect Equilibrium in a 
Model of a Race, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 193, 294295 (1985); Wing Suen, Ra-
tioning and Rent Dissipation in the Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals, 97 
J. POL. ECON. 1384 (1989). Full analysis of the dynamics of rent-dissipating 
races where the parties are not identically situated requires game theory. See, 
e.g., Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the 
Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization, 77 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 176 (1987) (providing a game-theoretic approach to rent dissipation 
analysis). 
 133. For a game-theoretic analysis underscoring the possibility of incom-
plete rent seeking, see Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A 
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 97 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 
1980). 
 134. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 127, at 41 (noting that entry by multiple 
parties to find a shipwreck might lead to the wreck being found earlier). 
 135. Archaeologists, however, argue that treasure hunters have generally 
caused archaeological damage. See, e.g., Christopher R. Bryant, The Archaeo-
logical Duty of Care: The Legal, Professional, and Cultural Struggle over Sal-
vaging Historic Shipwrecks, 65 ALB. L. REV. 97, 11011 (2001). 
 136. The law attempts to do this. See Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 21012106 (2000) (granting title of applicable shipwrecks to the United 
States). 
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has an incentive to raise the vessel when the benefits of doing 
so are greater than the costs. The owner, for example, may wait 
if technology for the task is expected to improve or become 
cheaper to overcome considerations of the time value of money. 
Similarly, consider the example of public fisheries.137 The exis-
tence of rent dissipation in the absence of property rights is 
particularly apparent here, as competition may lead to over-
fishing and the destruction of the fishery. The problem, how-
ever, is broader than overfishing. If the government, for exam-
ple, permitted fishing each year until a sustainable 1000 fish 
were harvested, an inefficiently high number of fishermen 
would still enter the market, dissipating the value of each har-
vest. But if the right to the 1000 fish were granted to a single 
fisherman, perhaps through an auction, then the fishermans 
private incentive would be to maximize the value of this rent by 
minimizing the cost of seeking the 1000 fish. Similarly, if the 
entire fishery were sold, then the owner would have both static 
and dynamic incentives to engage in the optimal amount of 
fishing. That is, the owner will have appropriate incentives to 
choose the number of fish to extract in a year and to select a 
technology, and thus a speed, at which those fish will be ex-
tracted in a particular year. 
2. Rent Dissipation in Patent Law 
Although rent dissipation has received little attention in 
copyright law, the potential of property rights to reduce rent 
dissipation animates Edmund Kitchs prospecting theory of 
patent law.138 Research into potential innovations can be a 
form of rent dissipation.139 If there were a million dollars in po-
tential profit to be made in developing an invention, for exam-
ple, by marketing and improving the light bulb, then in the ab-
sence of patent protection, producers would dissipate away this 
potential profit. Such rent dissipation is less obvious than the 
rent dissipation of the gold rush, because the competition is 
likely to increase consumer welfare, but it is possible that the 
costs of such rent dissipation may exceed the benefits.140 
 
 137. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-
Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954) (discussing the 
absence of rents in the fishing industry). 
 138. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
 139. See id. at 27677. 
 140. Rent dissipation theory is thus insufficient to make a priori welfare 
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Kitchs observation is that patent law does for innovation 
policy what a prospecting system does for a gold rush,141 pro-
viding property rights that reduce the possibility of rent dissi-
pation. In the absence of property rights in the gold context, no 
one has an incentive to prospect for gold, unless a discovery can 
at least temporarily be kept secret, because others will imme-
diately converge to share in any reward. Just as a property 
right solves this problem, so too does patent law provide an in-
centive to generate innovation despite the possibility of second-
mover advantages.142 That point is a twist on the traditional 
incentive rationale for patent law,143 but Kitch also emphasized 
that a patent improves postinvention incentives,144 because 
there is no risk of a rent-dissipating race to improve a patented 
product. In the absence of patent protection, such a race might 
result in excessive, partly redundant research. More inventors 
may pursue a particular line of research than is socially opti-
mal.145 
Patents, however, cannot eliminate rent dissipation alto-
gether, as Donald McFetridge and Douglas Smith pointed out 
shortly after Kitch.146 Rather, patent protection pushes rent-
dissipating entry to an earlier stage. Instead of competing to 
improve and market an existing innovation, private parties in a 
patent regime will compete to obtain the patent.147 The result is 
 
assessments, a task which industrial organization attempts. See Abramowicz, 
supra note 108, at 11011 (noting the need for careful empirical analysis of 
markets for copyrighted works). For a further discussion of the rent dissipa-
tion problem in patent law, see Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 
56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 18193 (2003). 
 141. Kitch, supra note 138, at 27175. 
 142. First-mover advantages may give some incentive to innovate even ab-
sent patent protection. See, e.g., Cecelia A. Conrad, The Advantage of Being 
First and Competition Between Firms, 1 INTL J. INDUS. ORG. 353, 363 (1983); 
Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 
97 ECON. J. 99, 11516 (Supp. 1987); Richard Schmalensee, Product Differen-
tiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 36061 
(1982). 
 143. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 497 n.2 (1974) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ([T]he basic economic function of the patent system 
is to encourage the making and commercialization of inventions . . . .). 
 144. Kitch, supra note 138, at 28586. 
 145. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCER-
TAINTY AND INFORMATION 25960 (Mark Perlman ed., 1992). 
 146. Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and 
Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 198 (1980). 
 147. Patents do not, however, eliminate postpatent rent-dissipating races, 
because inventors may still seek to invent around existing patents. The courts 
have embraced inventing around as an important benefit of the patent system. 
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a patent race. That patent races are examples of rent dissipa-
tion may seem counterintuitive, because scientific races, 
whether or not for patents, often accelerate the pace of innova-
tion.148 Yet, patent races can also produce redundancy, espe-
cially if different competitors run down the same blind alleys, 
unaware of their competitors successes and failures.149 Thus, 
patent races are a useful example of rent dissipation that has 
some benefit for third parties, consumers who eventually will 
receive surplus from the invention.150 The ultimate cost-benefit 
balance is theoretically indeterminate, and presumably varies 
from one patent race to the next. Even more theoretically com- 
 
 
See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that inventing around is one of the important public 
benefits that justify awarding the patent owner exclusive rights to his inven-
tion); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 123536 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (arguing that inventing around bring[s] a steady flow of innova-
tions to the marketplace). Yet inventing around can be redundant too, espe-
cially if the new invention offers no advantage over the previous one. See, e.g., 
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1813, 1869 (1984); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive 
Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 455 (1969). A recent analysis suggests that be-
tween-patent competition, i.e., competition from others with similar products, 
may cost an innovator as much as within-patent competition, i.e., competi-
tion from generic products after a patent expires. See Frank R. Lichtenberg & 
Tomas J. Philipson, The Dual Effects of Intellectual Property Regulations: 
Within and Between Patent Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry 
(Harris Sch. of Pub. Poly, Working Paper No. 02.09, 2002). 
 148. Competition in sequencing the human genome provides a recent ex-
ample. See Eliot Marshall, Rival Genome Sequencers Celebrate a Milestone To-
gether, 288 SCIENCE 2294, 2294 (2000) (reporting on the early completion of an 
initial sequence). For an argument that patent races often accelerate innova-
tion and lead to inventions entering the public domain earlier than they oth-
erwise would, see John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 44344 (2004). 
 149. While patent races may accelerate the point at which a patent is 
awarded, they also can delay that period. Participants in a patent race may 
reveal enough information to prevent their competitors from obtaining a pat-
ent first, in effect moving the end point of the race farther away. See, e.g., 
Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. 
L. REV. 2175, 219799 (2000) (providing a model of the incentive to engage in 
strategic disclosure); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 926 (2000) (discussing the possibility of strategic disclosure). Such stra-
tegic disclosure can enhance efficiency, by limiting the scope of patents and 
thus reducing deadweight costs, but also may decrease the incentives to obtain 
patents in the first place. See id. at 94445. 
 150. Robert Merges and Richard Nelson argued that Kitch understated the 
value of competition among researchers. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 
872 (1990). 
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plex is a comparison of the harm from pre-patent and postin-
vention rent dissipation. Though an important qualification, 
the McFetridge-Smith analysis thus does not entirely under-
mine Kitchs suggestion that patent laws concentration of 
prospecting rights promotes efficiency.151 
Mark Grady and Jay Alexander extended Kitchs analysis 
while acknowledging this point by arguing that patent law 
seeks to provide a balance between the inefficiencies of patent 
races and the competitive development of existing innova-
tions.152 Sometimes the threat of improvement-stage rent dis-
sipation calls for broad protection; sometimes no such threat 
exists, making patent protection less important, argued Grady 
and Alexander,153 who were the first to elaborate a connection 
between the patent and rent dissipation literatures.154 Patent 
law grants broad protection when an invention signals a set of 
improvements, and patents in such cases preclude any possi-
bility of a rent-dissipating rush to discover the modifica-
tions.155 Patent law limits protection where patent races pre-
sent the greater rent dissipation danger. For example, Grady 
and Alexander suggested that patent laws utility require-
ment156 precludes patenting of compounds that have no known 
use because a rule allowing chemicals to be patented before a 
use could be demonstrated would prompt a race to claim as 
many chemicals as possible, in the hope that some would prove 
useful during the patent term.157 
 
 
 151. Another argument in favor of prospect theory is that there may be an-
other means of reducing rent dissipation that is not socially inefficient. In par-
ticular, patent races reduce the effective patent term, resulting in a transfer 
from inventors to society. See Duffy, supra note 148, at 444. 
 152. Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 
78 VA. L. REV. 305, 317 (1992) ([A] full accounting of the effects of the patent 
system must balance the savings in reduced follow-on investment against the 
losses from accelerated pioneering investment. It may be that the avoidance of 
follow-on rent dissipation more than makes up for the consequences of the 
race to be first.). This account thus balances the costs of both types of rent 
dissipation. A broader theory might also consider the benefits, such as the ex-
tent to which competition is likely to increase the amount of innovation. 
 153. Id. at 318. 
 154. Kevin Rhodes briefly made such a connection before Grady and Alex-
ander. See Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuits Patent Nonobvious-
ness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1051, 1088 (1991). 
 155. Grady & Alexander, supra note 152, at 318. 
 156. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 157. Grady & Alexander, supra note 152, at 339. 
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Regardless of whether Grady and Alexanders rent dissipa-
tion theory of patent law accurately captures both doctrine and 
actual judicial decision making,158 their approach recognizes 
the possibility of excessive and redundant innovative activity at 
both the patenting and the improvement stages. The rent dis-
sipation literature, however, is important not only because it 
focuses attention on the amount of innovative activity, but also 
on the possibility that competition may force deployment, ei-
ther of an original invention or of follow-on inventions, at an 
earlier than optimal time. Because inventors want to obtain 
market share, they may commercialize inventions before it 
would be socially efficient for them to do so. Patent protection, 
if sufficiently broad, can prevent earlier than optimal deploy-
ment of inventions, albeit possibly at the risk of later than op-
timal deployment. This theme dates back to an article by 
Yoram Barzel,159 which in turn inspired Kitchs work,160 and 
may be of even greater relative salience in the copyright con-
text. 
3. A Preliminary Rent Dissipation Model of Copyright 
At first, it might appear that copyright law fails to curb 
rent-dissipating activity, because the property rights of copy-
right law are much weaker than those of patent. While a patent 
prevents follow-on innovation, copyright, in both doctrine and 
rhetoric, encourages authors to take earlier authors ideas and 
improve upon them, as long as they do so with original expres-
sion.161 If copyright law were designed single-mindedly, with 
minimization of rent dissipation as a goal, it likely would not 
allow this. Instead, copyright law might grant the first author 
in a particular genre the derivative right to that genre, at least 
 
 158. For evaluations of the Grady-Alexander thesis, see Donald L. Martin, 
Reducing Anticipated Rewards from Innovation Through Patents: Or Less Is 
More, 78 VA. L. REV. 351 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent 
District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359 
(1992); and A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of PatentsThe 
Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 28486 (1996). 
 159. See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 348, 354 (1968) (discussing the possibility of earlier-than-optimal de-
ployment of an invention). 
 160. Kitch, supra note 138, at 265. 
 161. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (To give to the author of 
the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examina-
tion of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a 
fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copy-
right.). 
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for some period of time. And so, J.K. Rowling might have to pay 
royalties to J.R.R. Tolkien, or the first cookbook to illustrate 
recipes with step-by-step pictures might be able to prevent pub-
lication of subsequent works. 
A copyright law with such broad rights, call it a super-
copyright regime, is almost certainly unattractive. Authors 
who obtained supercopyrights would have an incentive to li-
cense works beyond their own, but the result would be a far 
lower number of works than currently exists, likely at least by 
an order of magnitude. The product differentiation and rent 
dissipation literatures recognize that there is some benefit to 
product diversity that market entrants cannot capture.162 Al-
though providing individual copyright owners control over en-
tire genres of works would limit rent seeking, it would prevent 
not only attempts to obtain rents by producing relatively re-
dundant works, but also attempts to obtain rents by producing 
creative works that would add substantially to consumer sur-
plus. Supercopyright owners would have relatively little incen-
tive to innovate, and copyright offerings would thus generally 
be boring. Authors, moreover, would set relatively high prices 
for their works,163 producing deadweight loss. 
The supercopyright regime, moreover, would be difficult to 
administer. Patent offices and courts make judgments about 
the scope of patent rights, but the universe of ideas that would 
be copyrightable subject matter would be larger than the uni-
verse of patentable subject matter.164 It is, of course, the spec-
ter of a supercopyright office making substantive assessments 
that would be the greatest concern, even if we had confidence 
 
 162. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 112, at 25659 (arguing that copyright law 
should seek to increase authors ability to appropriate surplus). 
 163. If copyright is a natural monopoly, some form of natural monopoly 
regulation might be used to control prices. See generally POSNER, supra note 
127, at 37796 (describing the economic justification for price regulation of 
natural monopoly common carriers). The task might be far more difficult given 
the number and diversity of copyrighted works, however. 
 164. The number of copyrights (under current rules at least) dwarfs the 
number of patents. In 2001, the Copyright Office registered 601,659 claims. 
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHTS: COPYRIGHT LAW ADMINISTRATION (2001), available at http://www 
.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2001/law.pdf. In the same year, 326,508 patent 
applications were filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. See U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO 
THE PRESENT (2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts 
.htm. This understates the difference between the number of copyrights and 
patents, however, as registration is not required for copyright protection. 
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that the relevant officials had all the tools they would need to 
make copyright run smoothly. Freedom of speech may not be 
absolute, but preventing someone from expressing an idea in 
any form or writing in a particular genre would seem to be a 
paradigmatic violation of freedom of speech. First Amendment 
doctrine, of course, tolerates the current copyright regime,165 
but granting the copyright office or even the courts the power to 
determine whether an idea is original or derivative would be 
dangerous, as would a copyright regime that allows the initia-
tor of an idea to prevent others from repeating it. 
For these reasons, then, this supercopyright regime is in-
tolerable. Copyright law must allow a great deal of rent-
dissipating production of copyrighted works, because we cannot 
have agencies and courts making case-by-case determinations 
of the value that individual works provide. That does not, how-
ever, mean that copyright law should necessarily give up on 
limiting rent dissipation. There may be some relatively easy-to-
apply rules that can limit some forms of rent dissipation, with-
out undue affront to other values that copyright seeks to pro-
tect. The following two modifications, for example, might make 
the supercopyright regime palatable: First, we might allow free 
copying of ideas. Second, we might limit the genres over which 
a copyright owner could exert control to those in which the 
genre is encapsulated by the copyright owners expression (for 
example, in delineating a particular character) rather than by 
an idea. These are significant exceptions, but ones that might 
limit competition among works using substantially similar ex-
pression. What would such a copyright system look like? Much 
like the one that we actually have. 
C. APPLICATION TO THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT AND RELATED 
DOCTRINES 
1. The Derivative Right Reconsidered 
Rent dissipation theory provides a straightforward expla-
nation of the derivative right. Critically, the central concern is 
not that derivative works may be redundant with the original. 
 
 165. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (detailing the 
interaction between First Amendment and the fundamental principles of copy-
right); Roy Export Co. v. CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982) (No 
circuit . . . has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the 
copyright field distinct from any accommodation embodied in the fair use doc-
trine.). 
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If redundancy between the original and derivative works were 
the concern, then copyright law could employ additional strate-
gies to discourage even the original author from creating de-
rivative works, for example by providing that derivative works 
do not enjoy the protection of copyrights reproduction right. 
Under such a bizarre rule, J.K. Rowling would have exclusive 
rights to write a Harry Potter sequel, but anyone would be able, 
subject only to trademark restrictions,166 to sell pirated copies 
of that work. Such a rule would be not only unjust but also un-
wise, because derivative works are rarely redundant with the 
corresponding original works in the critical sense of competing 
for the same market share. A derivative work will rarely steal 
much business from the earlier original work,167 so even if a de-
rivative work and the original work share many similarities, 
the later work will almost never be a substitute for the earlier 
one.168 
The concern, rather, is that derivative works will be re-
dundant with one another. If anyone were allowed to create de-
rivative works, entry would come close to dissipating entirely 
the rents associated with commercial exploitation of the rele-
vant expression. Rent dissipation may not be complete; movie-
goers may prefer the authorized Harry Potter sequel or movie 
to those produced by unofficial imitators, so the original author 
would still be able to exploit the work through transformations 
to some extent.169 But the competition among the unauthorized 
 
 166. The Supreme Court recently showed some reluctance to allow trade-
mark doctrine to protect works no longer protected by copyright. See Dastar 
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 3637 (2003) (hold-
ing that the Lanham Act does not require copiers of an uncopyrighted work to 
credit the original authors of the work). 
 167. There may be exceptions. For example, someone might decide to rent a 
mobster movie and choose between The Godfather and The Godfather II. The 
films, however, are more often likely to be complements than substitutes. 
 168. In some contexts, it may be straightforward to imagine knockoff de-
rivative works that would steal business, for example, purses that borrow 
themes from designer models. Fashion designs, however, are ordinarily not 
protected by copyright. See generally Leslie J. Hagin, A Comparative Analysis 
of Copyright Laws Applied to Fashion Works: Renewing the Proposal for Fold-
ing Fashion Works into the United States Copyright Regime, 26 TEX. INTL L.J. 
341 (1991) (discussing copyrights treatment of fashion design). At the same 
time, it is difficult to think of knockoffs in categories of derivative works. Even 
if Harry Potter leads to the creation of some additional books about wizards, it 
seems unlikely that many customers who otherwise would have purchased 
Harry Potter would have purchased these books instead. 
 169. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that rent dissipa-
tion will not be complete where parties are not identically situated). 
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creators probably would at least dissipate any rents for unau-
thorized versions, because unauthorized entry would continue 
until expected profits are zero. In addition, the unauthorized 
works would dissipate a portion of the rent that the original au-
thor would otherwise enjoy from authorized derivatives, though 
rent dissipation here will be incomplete because unauthorized 
authors will never be able to create authorized derivative 
works. Once again, the concern here is not with redundancy in 
an informal sense, for derivative works will generally bear 
more resemblance to an original than to one another. Rather, it 
is with redundancy in an economic sense, the danger of exces-
sive entry into product space. Even if a group of derivative 
works differs in ways that seem relevant from a literary or aes-
thetic perspective, they may all be targeting the same con-
sumer demand. 
Some derivative works will have high social value, but 
copyright law does not prevent the production of such works. 
Rather, it places the decision whether to produce derivative 
works associated with a particular instance of expression in a 
single actor, the copyright holder, who has incentives to con-
sider both the demand diversion associated with the new work 
as well as demand creation, the demand that otherwise would 
go unsatisfied. The copyright holders incentive is to maximize 
the rent and thus to minimize wasteful rent dissipation. Of 
course, there are circumstances in which a copyright holder 
might seek to block a derivative work not because the copyright 
holder fears business stealing, but because the derivative work 
entails a message that the copyright holder dislikes or fears 
will undermine the original work. These circumstances, how-
ever, are for the fair use doctrine to take into account.170 
Perhaps even more importantly, the derivative right may 
reduce rent dissipation not only by reducing the number of 
 
 170. The Supreme Court held that this type of harm alone cannot serve as 
the basis of a claimed copyright violation. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 
U.S. 569, 59192 (1994) ([W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater re-
view, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable un-
der the Copyright Act.). The problem is that there may be works that both 
compete with authorized derivative works and entail a message that the copy-
right holder dislikes. See generally Laura Bradford, Parody and Perception: 
Using Cognitive Research to Expand Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV. 
705 (2005) (arguing that copyright theorists have paid insufficient attention to 
attempts by copyright owners to block works that may undermine the message 
of the original). Whether the fair use doctrine should protect such works is be-
yond the scope of this Article. 
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relatively redundant works, but also by eliminating the subop-
timally early release of adaptations. The problem is partly that 
consumers would have been harmed by a release of a movie 
version of Harry Potter almost simultaneously with publication 
of the book.171 An owner of a derivative right has an incentive 
to take into account that a long period in which consumers an-
ticipate an adaptation may increase consumers enjoyment of 
the adaptation, but in the absence of the derivative right, first-
mover advantages would produce a copyright race. More impor-
tantly, the race to create adaptations may result in higher costs 
and lower quality. Lower quality works may take less time to 
complete and hit the market first, and the consumers who pur-
chase these works may have less of an appetite for future de-
rivatives than they would have had if the initial works were of 
higher quality.172 No doubt, J.K. Rowling would have had many 
readers for her authorized sequels even if dozens of unauthor-
ized sequels had appeared in the interim, but it is not implau-
sible that her publisher would have rushed her to minimize 
consumer fatigue. 
A derivative right greatly reduces the possibility of ineffi-
cient races after the initial creation of copyrighted expression. 
Of course, patents solve postinvention rent dissipation only at 
the expense of races to obtain patents, so we must assess 
whether the derivative right could produce races to obtain 
copyrights.173 The derivative right, however, is not so broad as 
to make such races possible. Because the derivative right cov-
ers only expression and not ideas, and because the number of 
 
 171. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that time lags may 
increase consumer excitement and thus enjoyment of the copyrighted works). 
 172. A recent example occurs beyond the scope of the derivative right as 
one television network hastily produced a boxing reality show to beat a rival to 
the punch. See Dave Walker, Do the Fight Thing: Foxs Reality Rip-Off Proves 
That All Is Fair in Love and Boxing, TIMESPICAYUNE, Sept. 7, 2004, at D1, 
available at 2004 WLNR 1555138. 
 173. Copyright races are rare under current copyright law because the first 
person to obtain a copyright does not obtain a copyright on the genre as a 
whole. If patent law were also nonexclusive, there similarly would likely be 
fewer patent races, and indeed one commentator has suggested a nonexclusive 
patent system for this reason. See John S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonex-
clusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2253 (2002). The difficult question 
is whether a nonexclusive patent system would lead to more or less redundant 
development. Id. at 226872. Leibovitz points out that inventors would have 
an incentive to license their technological advances to firms lagging behind 
them in development, since those firms would be able to obtain patent rights 
as well. Id. at 2272. But laggards might be less likely to drop out of a patent 
race for precisely this reason. 
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ways that themes can be expressed is virtually infinite, the pro-
tection of the derivative right provides no incentive to race. 
There may still be races, for example, to produce the first as-
teroid movie, but the derivative right will not make such races 
any more fierce. The existence of the derivative right may well 
increase total investment in works from which derivative rights 
might follow, but this seems unlikely to increase the total num-
ber of works created.174 The derivative right thus does not de-
mand the subtle balancing of alternative forms of rent dissipa-
tion assessed by Grady and Alexander in the patent context.175 
The derivative right eliminates racing to develop adaptations of 
existing expression, without fostering races to create expression 
in the first place. Increases in patent scope, by contrast, reduce 
rent dissipation in seeking improvements, but increase the in-
efficiency of patent races to obtain the invention initially. 
The breadth of the derivative right, however, is not without 
social cost. The copyright holder may be able to charge more for 
derivative works because of the exclusive derivative right, thus 
increasing deadweight loss.176 It is possible that this social loss 
could exceed the benefit of minimizing rent dissipation, but 
Congress has plausibly struck the right balance. Allowing mo-
nopolization of genres defined by ideas might create a great 
deal of market power, but allowing monopolization of genres 
defined by expression seems likely to create less market power, 
because the relevant markets will be smaller. Not anyone can 
make a Freddy Krueger film, but Freddy at least has to com-
pete with Jason for ticket and video sales.177 Even the most 
popular derivative works are generally priced at approximately 
the same level as other works,178 so it seems doubtful that 
 
 174. See supra Part I.A. 
 175. See supra notes 15257 and accompanying text. 
 176. See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of 
Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 99100 (1997) (explaining 
how copyright law may create deadweight loss). 
 177. Unless, of course, the owners of the respective copyrights authorize a 
joint derivative work. See FREDDY VS. JASON (New Line Cinema 2003). 
 178. All 870 pages of one of the most recent Harry Potter books, J.K. ROWL-
ING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX (2003), could have been 
yours in hardcover at the time of this publication for just $19.20, and it was 
priced at $29.99 upon release. See http://www.amazon.com (search for Harry 
Potter and the Order of the Phoenix) (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). This pricing 
strategy may seem surprising, considering the number of people who likely 
would be willing to pay $40 for the book. The strategy, however, may be dic-
tated by a large number of anticipated marginal buyers. Or perhaps the pub-
lisher worries that a high price would lead even some who value Harry Potter 
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deadweight loss from high pricing is unusually high. 
The greater concern is that the derivative right may over-
compensate for the problems it fixes. Because copyright owners 
cannot capture the full social value of their creations, they may 
have a tendency to produce too few derivative works. A copy-
right owner will keep producing derivatives until the marginal 
private benefit is equal to the marginal private cost. The mar-
ginal private benefit of creating a derivative work may be lower 
than the social benefit. This effect, however, seems likely to be 
small, because as long as there is consumer interest in new de-
rivative works, authors (or at least publishers) in due time will 
have incentives to oblige. Conceivably, copyright owners might 
wait an inefficiently long time between adaptations, but this 
too seems to be an unlikely concern. In patent law, waiting may 
lower production costs as the price of inputs falls, but for copy-
righted works, production costs will not necessarily go down 
over time.179 
It is possible, of course, that some compromise between the 
derivative right as it currently exists and a regime without 
such a right would be optimal. Perhaps a profit-allocation ap-
proach along the lines suggested by Rubenfeld could help 
achieve an appropriate balance,180 but the transaction costs of 
such a system might well be sufficiently great to offset any in-
crease in efficiency that it might provide. Moreover, rent dissi-
pation theory shows that the approach might be little different 
from a regime of no derivative right. If anyone could make a 
derivative work, then entry would be expected to dissipate 
away economic profit in any event. So on average, each author 
of an unauthorized derivative work would earn zero economic 
profit. Zero economic profit is shorthand for a normal rate of re-
turn.181 Therefore, depending on the accounting scheme em-
ployed, the original author might actually receive something, 
especially since the author would enjoy a portion of the upside 
benefit of derivative works, without assuming any of the risk 
 
at more than that price not to buy because they may believe they are being 
cheated. 
 179. Even in film, technology improvements do not necessarily make mov-
ies any cheaper, as consumers have higher expectations for special effects. See, 
e.g., Paul Vlahos, The Zbig Movie Miracle, http://zbigvision.com/MovieMiracle 
.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (noting that the cost of producing movies has 
not fallen over time, even after adjusting for inflation). 
 180. See supra notes 8489 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 108, at 51 nn.4849 and accompany-
ing text. 
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that a derivative work might suffer a loss. But depending on 
the profit percentage, such royalties may well be quite small. 
Does the derivative right provide the optimal copyright 
law? Certainly the derivative right leaves many forms of re-
dundancy, including redundant development of uncopyrighted 
works.182 At the same time, the derivative right might be nar-
rower. For example, copyright law might explicitly consider the 
number of existing or planned derivative works to determine 
the extent of redundancy and allow works where derivative 
rights in essence have been abandoned.183 Just because rent 
dissipation concerns help explain portions of copyright doctrine, 
however, does not mean that copyright doctrine would be im-
proved if rent dissipation concerns were considered explicitly 
on a case-by-case basis. The expense and uncertainty associ-
ated with such analyses may not be worth the benefits. Copy-
right law generally and the derivative right specifically are 
blunt instruments, but at least in an approximate way they re-
flect rent dissipation concerns. 
2. The Reproduction Right Reconsidered 
Rent dissipation theory applies equally to explain the 
breadth of the reproduction right: if there is a rent from further 
development of a particular character or plot line, the law can 
eliminate dissipation of that rent by providing a property right 
to that development. It is one thing for Sylvester Stallone to 
subject us to Rocky IIV, and possibly even a dreaded Rocky 
VI,184 but quite another if several other studios got into the act. 
Such a development seems unlikely for the Rocky series, given 
that a Rocky movie without Stallone would likely not sell well, 
but Stallone can prevent the use of his image only because of 
present technological limitations185 and because the right of 
 
 182. See supra notes 16 and accompanying text (providing examples). 
 183. Lawrence Lessig has argued for requiring de minimis copyright re-
newal fees to ensure that abandoned works are placed in the public domain. 
See Lawrence Lessig, The Public Domain Enhancement Act FAQ, 
http://eldred.cc/ea_faq.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (proposing the Eric El-
dred Act); Capitol Hill, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, June 25, 2003, available at 
http://www.lexis.com (noting Lessigs involvement). 
 184. See Josh Grossberg, Stallone Ready for Rocky Redux, EONLINE, Dec. 
12, 2002, http://www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,10969,00.htm?newsrellink. 
 185. But cf. Rod Easdown, Digital Stars, THE AGE, Jan. 16, 2002, at B1, 
available at 2002 WLNR 11861306 (describing the use of digital effects to put 
dead actors in new movies). See generally Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at 
Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of Deceased EntertainersA 21st Cen-
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publicity may similarly prevent rent dissipation.186 In any 
event, copyright law can save us from innumerable unauthor-
ized sequels to The Lion King or unauthorized James Bond 
movies starring a new actor as Bond,187 even if trademark law 
somehow should turn out not to be up to the task. Copyright 
law can save us from unauthorized Lion King stuffed animals 
and 007 martini glasses as well. 
Rent dissipation theory, of course, does not apply as far as 
it might. Sylvester Stallone did not receive a monopoly on box-
ing movies, and not just because pictures like On the Water-
front188 established the genre before Stallones involvement. 
Copyright law does not extend property rights so far that sub-
sequent authors freedom to express ideas and pursue broad 
themes is limited. This is reflected, for example, in the scènes à 
faire doctrine, which allows the use of stock literary devices, 
such as scenes in a beer hall and the singing of the German na-
tional anthem in a film about the Nazis,189 even though some 
copyrightable work must have been the first to use such a de-
vice. Case law on parody, allowing some parodies to count as 
fair use even though they infringe, provides another important 
limit on copyright protection.190 Once again, though, my claim 
is not that rent dissipation is copyrights only concern. To the 
extent that copyright protection for characters is surprisingly 
broad, rent dissipation theory provides an explanation. 
The challenge for courts is determining whether a finding 
that a copyright exists would amount to giving a monopoly over 
a genre, or whether it would only prevent rent dissipating uses 
of the plaintiff s work. Copyright is relatively difficult to obtain 
for literary characters, because these characters are less devel-
oped and thus copyright might amount to a monopoly in a par-
 
tury Challenge for Intellectual Property Law, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 101 (1993) 
(considering the intellectual property consequences of reanimation). 
 186. See Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Public-
ity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 11112 (1994). 
 187. The possibility that competitors might produce different Bondses is 
not altogether hypothetical. Keith Poliakoff, Note, License to Copyright: The 
Ongoing Dispute Over the Ownership of James Bond, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 387, 388 (2000) (describing a controversy over ownership of the 
James Bond character). 
 188. ON THE WATERFRONT (Columbia Pictures 1954). 
 189. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 
1980) (finding this expression not to be copyrightable). 
 190. For a discussion of parody doctrine, see Alfred C. Yen, When Authors 
Wont Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 79 (1991). 
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ticular type of person.191 A close case not involving copyright on 
characters is Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co.192 The case concerned 
the copyrightability of a series of greeting cards.193 The alleg-
edly infringing greeting cards were stylistically similar to the 
originals, with respect to variables such as size, border, and 
script typeface, and both sets of cards included sentimental 
phrases, including the use of ellipses,194 but the phrases them-
selves were not copied.195 The court found copyrightability in 
the arrangement and found infringement as well.196 This case 
is troubling because it appears to give a monopoly over the 
most obvious style for implementing the idea of sentimental 
phrase greeting cards. The courts emphasis on alternative 
styles that the infringer might have adopted,197 however, re-
veals that the court at least was convinced that it was not 
granting a monopoly over the genre as a whole. 
The questions of copyright law are often fact-specific, and 
rent dissipation theory cannot provide general answers. Even 
where inquiries are not fact-specific, cases can be close. Con-
sider, for example, whether software manufacturers should be 
able to protect user interfaces. The case law is inconsistent,198 
 
 191. Paul Goldstein suggests the following test for a literary character: 
A literary character can be said to have a distinctive personality, and 
thus to be protectible, when it has been delineated to the point at 
which its behavior is relatively predictable so that, when placed in a 
new plot situation, it will react in ways that are at once distinctive 
and unsurprising. 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.7.2 (1998). This test is not entirely satisfy-
ing. Certain stereotyped characters can be scarcely delineated and yet have 
predictable behavior, while others may be well delineated and yet part of their 
delineation may be that they are unpredictable. Rent dissipation theory sug-
gests that the test should simply be whether the presence of the character is a 
significant factor in why people purchase the book. With this approach, an un-
authorized Rocky movie would infringe, but a two-minute peripheral scene in-
volving Rocky Balboa would not. 
 192. 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 193. Id. at 934. 
 194. A particularly awful example: I want to shout and tell the world how 
much I love you . . . but instead Ill just . . . whisper. Id. at 935. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 940. 
 197. See, e.g., id. (Berrie could have produced a non-infringing card with 
colored stripes, but Berrie used similar stripes flanking the verse on both the 
left and right side from top to bottom just as the FS cards did.). 
 198. Compare Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 807 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (finding that Lotus 123s menu command hierarchy was not copy-
rightable and thus not infringed by rival spreadsheet program Quattro Pro), 
with Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 137173 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting 
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and so is the rent dissipation analysis.199 On one hand, once a 
company has developed an effective user interface, allowing 
other software companies to take it is likely to dissipate the 
rent from the interface. On the other hand, software companies 
would still be able to dissipate the rent by offering competing 
programs with alternative user interfaces, and requiring com-
panies that will enter the market anyway to develop an alter-
native interface will increase the fixed costs of entry and thus 
rent dissipation. An additional consideration is the burden on 
users having to learn multiple interfaces. It is unclear which 
way this cuts. While the burden itself is a form of redundancy 
and thus akin to rent dissipation, it also may limit the number 
of firms that will choose to enter if a property right is found.200 
Given this complicated balancing, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that this remains a controversial area of copyright law.201 
3. The Copyright Term Reconsidered 
A perhaps surprising corollary to rent dissipation theorys 
explanation of the broad derivative and reproduction rights is 
that rent dissipation theory can help provide an explanation for 
the long copyright term.202 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
 
Lotus and finding command codes protectible). The technical issue in these 
cases was whether the menu commands were a method of operation and 
thus not copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Lotus, 49 F.3d at 816; 
Mitel, 124 F.3d at 137172. The Mitel court argued that even if the commands 
were a method of operation, the expression within them could still be copy-
righted. Id. at 1372. 
 199. An additional complicating factor in some cases is the difficulty of 
separating the user interface from the underlying functionality. See, e.g., 
Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 61419 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (addressing whether a game similar to Pac Man was infringing), 
superceded by statute on other grounds, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a), as recognized in 
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 200. A reverse balance exists in assessing the social welfare consequences 
of network externalities. See Abramowicz, supra note 108, at 8688 (discuss-
ing network externalities and copyright). On one hand, network externalities 
confer a direct benefit on consumers, but they also may hurt consumers if they 
discourage new innovations. The twist here is that learning a new interface 
imposes a cost on consumers, but it may benefit society indirectly by discour-
aging redundant entry. 
 201. For recent assessments of protection for software, see generally Bruce 
Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles 
Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 12223 
(2002), and Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Legal Protection for Software: Still a 
Work in Progress, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 445, 448 (2002). 
 202. A separate puzzle concerning the copyright term is that it is ordinarily 
based on the life of the author. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 
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Extension Act (CTEA) granted a twenty-year term extension 
for both existing and future works,203 providing a term of life of 
the author plus seventy years, or, in the case of works made for 
hire, a fixed term of the lesser of ninety-five years from the 
year of first publication or 120 years from creation.204 The Su-
preme Court upheld the CTEA in Eldred v. Ashcroft,205 though 
even if the Court had struck it down, the copyright term would 
still be quite long, both by historical standards206 and in com-
parison to the patent term.207 
The copyright term seems almost impossible to justify on 
traditional incentives grounds. A brief by prominent economists 
in support of the challenge to the term extension calculated 
that the term extension would produce a 0.33 percent increase 
in present value for a new work protected by copyright,208 and 
even that is generous, given the economists assumption that 
the work produces equal revenues each year. Perhaps publish-
ers are savvy enough to incorporate such anticipated future 
revenues into the payments they offer authors, but the amount 
is so small that it could lead to only a very small increase in the 
number of works.209 The small increase in present value for 
 
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). For a behavioral economics resolution of this puzzle, see Avishalom 
Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create Under a Lifetime-Plus-Years Copy-
right Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437 (2002). Rent dissipation theory offers a 
complementary explanation, that a work is less likely to be commercialized far 
beyond the authors death and that the authors life thus helps identify the pe-
riod in which use would likely amount to rent dissipation. Because authors 
often do not own copyrights in their creations, this factor will often not be sig-
nificant, but it may have been more significant in earlier times. 
 203. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 301304 (2000)). 
 204. Id. § 102(b) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)(c)). 
 205. 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003). 
 206. For a brief history of the copyright term, see Joseph A. Lavigne, 
Comment, For Limited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer via the Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 311, 31521 (1996). 
 207. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (providing for a term of twenty years from 
the date the patent application was filed). For a criticism of this disparity, see 
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Remarkableand IrrationalDisparity Be-
tween the Patent Term and the Copyright Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOCY 233 (2001). 
 208. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
 209. This consideration helps identify a problem with what might appear to 
be a case based on rent dissipation theory for a short copyright term. At first 
blush, a rent dissipation theory of copyright might seem to predict a relatively 
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new works, as the economists brief recognized, may not be dis-
positive, because the costs of a term extension would be borne 
in the future and thus should be discounted as well.210 The ra-
tio of deadweight loss to consumer surplus may be roughly 
comparable for both old and new works, if the demand and 
marginal revenue curves do not change shape over time. But 
other costs, particularly the tracing costs of identifying copy-
right owners and seeking permission to reproduce works,211 will 
become considerably higher over time. 
An incentives argument in any event cannot justify a ret-
roactive term extension, because a copyright term extension 
cannot increase incentives to create works that already exist. 
At best, a retroactive term extension might lead publishers to 
anticipate future retroactive term extensions, but simply grant-
ing an even longer prospective extension would appear on an 
incentives rationale to be a more direct, if still flawed, ap-
proach. Meanwhile, there might appear to be several costs of a 
retroactive extension, as the economists brief argued. First, the 
term extension will produce deadweight loss from monopoly 
pricing.212 Second, the extension will reduce innovation by re-
stricting the production of new creative works using existing 
materials.213 Third, the property right will lead to costly bar-
gaining and contracting.214 
The economists conclusion that the first and third argu-
ments imply costs seem accurate, but the second argument is  
 
 
short term. If many copyrighted works are redundant, then a short term 
would result in the production of fewer works, and rent dissipation theory 
suggests that the decrease in incentives to produce new works might be wel-
fare improving, or at least not as welfare reducing as would appear in the ab-
sence of the theory. This consideration, however, is small, because the present 
discounted value of revenues from copyright many years in the future are 
small. 
 210. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al., supra note 208, at 2 (With respect to 
the term extension for new works, the present value of the additional cost is 
small, just as the present value of incremental benefits is small.). Landes and 
Posner identify the possibility of an argument that the appropriate discount 
rate for the costs might be lower than that for the benefits. See William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 471, 481 n.22 (2003). 
 211. See Landes & Posner, supra note 210, at 47778. 
 212. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al., supra note 208, at 1011. 
 213. Id. at 1213 (If the later innovator must pay for use of the earlier 
work, this will raise the innovator's cost of making new works, reducing the 
set of new works produced.). 
 214. Id. at 1314. 
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more problematic.215 The economists seem to assume that pro-
duction of new works using existing materials necessarily will 
be socially beneficial,216 but they do not even acknowledge the 
industrial organization literature that points out the possibility 
of excessive entry.217 Nor do they recognize the possibility that 
even if entry is not excessive, new creative works produced 
from existing materials, even if representing commercially sig-
nificant improvements over those materials, may tend to be re-
dundant with one another. And the economists do not acknowl-
edge that in the rare cases when a work remains valuable as a 
source for adaptations when its copyright expires, a rent-
dissipating race to produce adaptations might result. Rent dis-
sipation theory, by contrast, identifies unrestricted use of exist-
ing materials to produce new ones, i.e., the unauthorized crea-
tion of derivative works as precisely the type of use most likely 
to be economically inefficient. 
The debate on the CTEA has focused intensely on just such 
a use, as commentators have recognized that Disney has lob-
bied in favor of the extension in order to protect its copyright on 
Mickey Mouse.218 The assumption that Mickey Mouses entry 
into the public domain would be welfare enhancing is perplex-
ing, even absent the analysis in this Article. Should Mickey 
Mouse enter the public domain, there might be reduced monop-
oly pricing of Steamboat Willie, but that benefit seems trivial 
and is not the focus of the statutes critics.219 The more signifi-
cant effect would be to allow, subject to trademark limita-
 
 215. An additional complication is that the copyright extension may en-
courage investment in existing works, for example in the colorization of a 
black-and-white movie. See Landes & Posner, supra note 210, at 49091. For 
an argument that the Copyright Clause is not concerned with this class of 
public goods problems, see Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public 
Goods: Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 165 (2002). 
 216. The assumption is also clear elsewhere in the brief. See, e.g., Brief of 
George A. Akerlof et al., supra note 208, at 89 (One might argue that the 
windfall to authors of existing copyrights has a positive consequence, by pro-
viding them with more resources for additional creative projects.). 
 217. See supra Part II.A. 
 218. See, e.g., Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even 
Mickey Mouse Joins the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B7 (discussing the 
relevance of Mickey Mouse to the debate over the copyright extension). 
 219. A proponent of the term extension makes a similar point. See Scott M. 
Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind At-
tacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 317
18 (2002) (Is there a huge market anxiously awaiting the royalty-free distri-
bution of a 1928 black-and-white cartoon over the Internet?). 
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tions,220 anyone to insert Mickey Mouse into their own films 
and comic books. Do we really need even more Mickey Mouse 
movies and comic books than we already have? The term exten-
sion critics seem to assume that we do, and perhaps they are 
right. Parodic uses of Mickey Mouse especially might be enrich-
ing,221 but encouraging such uses seems more relevant to fair 
use analysis, which already considers parody.222 
Rent dissipation theory, however, suggests that the bene-
fits of increased production to even devoted fans of Mickey are 
likely to be relatively small.223 Consumer welfare might well 
rise from the availability of additional sources for Mickey prod-
ucts, even though many consumers would probably have inter-
est only in Disney-certified products. But if there were a rent to 
be made from unauthorized Mickey Mouse T-shirts, comic 
books, and movies, the competition among Disney competitors 
to produce such materials likely would dissipate that rent al-
most completely.224 Moreover, the competition would lead to a 
race to produce derivative works, possibly lowering quality. 
Disney, of course, recognized this and presumably feared it, as 
royalties from Steamboat Willie seem unlikely to be sufficient 
to justify Disneys lobbying. These costs are at least what ani-
mated Disney and explain the long copyright term, regardless 
of whether they produce a sufficiently strong normative justifi-
cation for it. 
Even with the benefit of rent dissipation theory, the term 
extension question is not easy. The deadweight costs of monop-
oly pricing for existing works and the transactions costs of ne-
gotiating licenses may make the copyright term extension inef-
ficient, and rent dissipation theory cannot prove that increases 
to consumer welfare from increased production of derivative  
 
 
 220. See id. at 317 n.184 (asserting that Disney has trademark rights to 
use of Mickey Mouse for numerous products). 
 221. But see Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 
1978) (involving the use of Mickey Mouse in adult comic books). Perhaps the 
more accurate statement would be that parodic uses of Mickey Mouse espe-
cially have the potential to be enriching, even if one concludes that the par-
ticular parodic use in Air Pirates was more prurient than enriching. 
 222. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 223. It is possible that entry could produce price competition, allowing 
Mickey fans to obtain products at lower prices and reduce deadweight cost as 
well. Casual empiricism, however, suggests that such effects are likely to be 
smallall movies rent for the same price at Blockbuster. 
 224. See supra Part II.B.1 (introducing rent dissipation). 
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works will be less than the harm borne by producers. Rent dis-
sipation theory provides a plausible defense of a long copyright 
term,225 but I mean only to suggest that rent dissipation theory 
provides a better explanation, not that it provides a convincing 
one.226 
Rent dissipation theory, however, can provide, at best, only 
a defense of the lengthy protection that the derivative right en-
joys. It cannot explain why there also is a long copyright term 
for the reproduction right (or, more specifically, for the repro-
duction rights prohibition on direct copying of copyrighted 
works). A superficially simple answer is that copyright law pro-
vides a single copyright term for all of the exclusive rights. 
Given that constraint, the determination of the copyright term, 
which requires a balancing of factors at different possible ter-
minal dates, should depend more on the economics associated 
with the derivative right than the economics associated with 
the reproduction right. The derivative rights relative impor-
tance increases throughout the copyright term, as the Mickey 
Mouse example usefully illustrates. Rent dissipation theory 
provides some support for a copyright term that lasts until 
drawbacks, like high tracing costs, become overwhelming.227 
 
 
 225. In the absence of a rent dissipation theory, the long copyright term 
seems explainable only as the worst form of political rent seeking. See, e.g., 
Richard Epstein, All Roads Lead to Rome, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, available 
at 2002 WLNR 6722325 (calling the CTEA a state giveaway of public domain 
property, pure and simple). Arguably, the term extension might reduce costs 
associated with political rent seeking since the enactment of the statute will 
leave advocates with nothing more to lobby for. See Landes & Posner, supra 
note 210, at 48384. The success of the term extension movement, however, 
might encourage other rent seekers. 
 226. It seems particularly problematic that the term extension even covers 
works that are no longer being exploited by their owners, for use of such works 
is not likely to be rent dissipating. Individually, such works are generally of 
little commercial value, but collectively they might have considerable value, 
and a regime requiring frequent modest payments to renew copyrights, as 
suggested recently by Landes and Posner, seems sensible. See generally Lan-
des & Posner, supra note 210. Landes and Posner note that most copyrights 
become valueless by the time of the first renewal period, as evidenced by the 
high percentage of copyright holders who fail to pay the small renewal fee. See 
id. at 50103. I criticize the argument that they raise in favor of a long copy-
right term in Abramowicz, supra note 108, at 8286. 
 227. This might provide a defense of a copyright term that becomes longer 
over time, as modern technology is likely to reduce the importance of tracing 
costs. There may well be competing considerations, however, and elsewhere I 
argue that there are strong reasons that copyright law should generally be-
come weaker over time. See Abramowicz, supra note 108, at 10809. 
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This analysis, however, rests on the assumption that copy-
right law provides the same term for the reproduction and de-
rivative rights. Providing a different term for the different 
rights would be simple as a matter of legislative drafting, but 
that masks an underlying complication. For copyright law to 
provide different reproduction and derivative terms, it would 
need to find a conceptual means of distinguishing the reproduc-
tion and derivative rights. We will now turn to that project. 
III.  REDEFINING THE REPRODUCTION AND 
DERIVATIVE RIGHTS 
Rent dissipation theory provides a straightforward basis 
for distinguishing the derivative right from the reproduction 
right, to the extent that the latter extends beyond direct copy-
ing. The purpose of such a project, of course, is not to help Con-
gress should it ever choose to mandate separate copyright 
terms, an unlikely prospect. Rather, in distinguishing the 
rights, we may be able to clarify their scope, and such clarifica-
tion may help in hard cases. In particular, such clarification 
may help prevent applications of those rights that do not ad-
vance their underlying purposes, best conceived. Though this 
Article praises the derivative right, I write also in part to bury 
some of its more aggressive applications. 
A. ECONOMIC TESTS 
1. The Tests 
Rent dissipation theory provides for straightforward, 
though not mechanical, definitions of the reproduction and de-
rivative rights. Recall that while the central concern of the re-
production right is that an unauthorized reproduction might 
compete with the original, rent dissipation theory suggests that 
a central concern of the derivative right is that unauthorized 
derivative works might compete with one another.228 Rent dis-
sipation alone cannot provide definitions of either right, as 
many works that clearly do not violate either right compete 
with both original works and their derivatives. For example, a 
new action movie will compete with other previously released 
action movies and with the sequels to those action movies. 
 
 
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 16669. 
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Once it is established, however, that an allegedly infring-
ing work is substantially similar to an original work,229 consid-
eration of demand diversion can help determine whether the 
reproduction right, the derivative right, both, or neither are 
violated. If the allegedly infringing work would be expected to 
cause significant demand diversion from the original, then the 
work would indeed infringe the reproduction right. If the alleg-
edly infringing work would be expected to cause significant 
demand diversion from actual or hypothetical transformations 
that the original author plausibly might make, then it would 
infringe the derivative right.230 
2. Preliminary Illustrations 
To clarify the definition and the type of evidence that liti-
gants might introduce in litigation, let us start with a simple 
illustration. Suppose that someone created an unauthorized se-
quel to the Harry Potter books, with the usual group of charac-
ters and the familiar if unpredictable setting of Hogwarts, but 
an entirely new plot. It seems far-fetched to imagine even a 
well-executed sequel taking away more than an insignificant 
amount of business from the original Harry Potter book. Even if 
the new work were priced at considerably less than the origi-
nal, only an unusual customer would decide not to buy the 
original because there existed a cheap imitation. In this re-
spect, books are not like handbags. It is quite plausible, how-
ever, to imagine that a sequel might interfere with sales of au-
thorized sequels as customers grow tired of reading Harry 
Potter sequels, especially if the unauthorized sequel were to 
beat an authorized one to market. Similarly, an unauthorized 
movie version of Harry Potter probably would steal only a mod-
est amount of business from the book, but it might steal a great 
deal of business from the authorized movie. 
This analysis may seem to succeed only at taking excep-
tionally easy cases and making them more complicated. The 
copyright statute explicitly identifies a motion picture version 
 
 229. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 230. The central concern with the derivative right is rent dissipation 
among all derivative works, including unauthorized derivative works. A test of 
the derivative work concept, however, should relate semantically to the origi-
nal work. Practically, this is essential too, as a court might need to assess 
whether a work is a derivative work before other alleged derivative works are 
even produced. Considering whether there would be significant demand diver-
sion from authorized transformations provides a straightforward way of test-
ing whether there is likely to be rent dissipation among derivative works. 
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of a work as a derivative work,231 and a book sequel fits 
squarely within the more general definition of a derivative 
work, which includes a work based upon one or more preexist-
ing works.232 My purpose, however, is to offer an economic cast 
to the definition for a derivative work. Because competition will 
always be a matter of degree, economic assessments will al-
ways be a matter of degree too, but this adds little uncertainty. 
A test seeking to identify substantial similarity will not be me-
chanical in any event, and adding one subjective assessment 
into an already subjective inquiry will not greatly compound 
the problem. It is at least reassuring that paradigmatic exam-
ples of derivative works, such as movie sequels or book transla-
tions, appear to fit within this economic approach. 
Let us now consider a slightly more difficult example. Sup-
pose that someone without authorization took the movie Harry 
Potter and the Sorcerers Stone and electronically transformed 
it, creating a black-and-white version. There is no doubt that 
the black-and-white version would be substantially similar to 
the original. The release would be a violation of the reproduc-
tion right, because a significant portion of any revenues from 
the decolorized movie would likely come at the expense of the 
original.233 That the black-and-white version might draw only a 
few customers is not relevant. The proper inquiry is whether 
these customers otherwise would have purchased the original. 
Some customers might choose the black-and-white version be-
cause they thought that it was truer to the theme, while others 
might favor the decolorized version because its producers sold 
it for less money to undercut the original. Either way, demand 
diversion seems likely to be substantial relative to sales of the 
black-and-white version. Intuitively, the modification of the 
original seems to be an attempt to evade the reproduction right. 
The above definition of the reproduction right, however, makes 
it possible to identify such attempts without any direct inquiry 
into motive. Perhaps the decolorization reflects solely artistic 
sensibilities, but that would not save the black-and-white ver-
sion from violation of the reproduction right. 
That is enough for the copyright holder to win, but let us 
consider the derivative right as well. Of course, if anyone were 
allowed to create decolorized videos and sell them, there would 
 
 231. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 232. Id. 
 233. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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be rent-dissipating entry of decolorized versions and cut-rate 
prices. But that is why the definition above looks for competi-
tion with actual and plausible authorized transformations, 
even though the overall concern of the derivative right is de-
mand diversion among all derivative works.234 Similarly, if the 
Harry Potter producers did release a black-and-white version, 
the two black-and-white versions might compete with one an-
other for that very small market segment. That is why the 
definition above considers only hypothetical transformations 
that the original author plausibly might make. The inquiry 
thus avoids tautology and demands a practical consideration of 
the relevant market. 
In this case, it seems unlikely that the black-and-white 
Harry Potter would compete with other authorized transforma-
tions, in part because decolorization seems like a poor vehicle 
for commercial exploitation of Harry Potter. The result is based 
on empirical considerations, though, as it is possible to imagine 
evidence that decolorization was a plausible means of exploit-
ing the original. In a world in which movie producers regularly 
released black-and-white versions to satisfy some portion of the 
viewing public, the black-and-white version would violate the 
derivative right as well as the reproduction right. The line ad-
mittedly is imprecise. There probably are a few customers who 
would buy a black-and-white version. The challenge for the 
court is to assess whether there are enough such customers to 
make release of a black-and-white version a sensible means of 
exploiting the copyright. Any evidence as to the movie studios 
actual intent would be admissible, as would be evidence gener-
ated from market surveys. Such surveys, however, would need 
to assess not simply how many consumers would prefer a black-
and-white version, but also how many who would not purchase 
the original would be interested in a black-and-white version. If 
that number is sufficiently high, then the black-and-white ver-
sion is a plausible transformation. 
The decolorization example may appear to present a prob-
lem for this approach. Colorized versions of movies generally 
are considered to be derivative works, so why should decolor-
ized versions not automatically be treated in the same way? 
The economic answer is that colorization, however artistically 
objectionable, often is a logical way to exploit a movie commer-
cially. Decolorization, on the other hand, seems far less likely to 
 
 234. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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be commercially viable, as indicated by the lack of decolorized 
authorized versions of movies at video rental stores. The result 
is that unauthorized colorized versions plausibly might com-
pete with authorized derivative adaptations, while unauthor-
ized decolorized versions will not. As a result, decolorization 
would violate the reproduction right, but not the derivative 
right. This rent dissipation answer, however, may seem prob-
lematic from the perspective of the copyright statute. The defi-
nition of derivative work includes any form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.235 If colorization is a 
recasting, transformation, or adaptation, shouldnt decoloriza-
tion count as such as well? 
An apparently easy answer may be that decolorization re-
quires less originality or skill than colorization. Originality of 
the modification made to a work might appear to be all that is 
required under conventional glosses on the definition of de-
rivative work.236 Rubenfeld endorses this definition as well.237 
But if I accept this answer, then the rent dissipation approach 
that I have suggested seems misplaced. The conventional ap-
proach scrutinizes the modifications themselves, not the effect 
of the modifications on the work.238 The rent dissipation ap-
proach, in contrast, considers the effect of the modifications, 
specifically by assessing the demand diversion that the new 
work will effect from other authorized transformations (for the 
derivative right) or from the original work (for the reproduction 
right).239 Let us thus assume that colorization and decoloriza-
tion are equally difficult tasks, both requiring a fair amount of 
specifically applied artistic expertise. Given this assumption, 
can we find some way of reconciling the economic test that I 
have proposed with the statutory text? 
3. Textual Defenses 
I believe that we can, and indeed, that a reading of the 
definition of derivative right that considers effects is more 
consistent with the statutory text than one that seeks to iden-
 
 235. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 236. See generally Steven S. Boyd, Deriving Originality in Derivative 
Works: Considering the Quantum of Originality Needed to Attain Copyright 
Protection in a Derivative Work, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 325 (2000). 
 237. See Rubenfeld, supra note 52 at 5355. 
 238. See, e.g., Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Intl. Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 
117 (2d Cir. 2003) (employing the conventional substantial similarity test). 
 239. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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tify originality in modifications alone.240 Consider first the sec-
ond sentence of the definition of derivative work: A work 
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or 
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original 
work of authorship, is a derivative work.241 The words repre-
sent an . . . original work of authorship indicate what Congress 
implicitly envisioned.242 The modifications to a work must 
themselves be original, for a nonoriginal modification can never 
create something original. But that is not enough. The word 
represent recognizes that modifications are not of interest in 
and of themselves, but only in that they point to or symbolize 
something broader. To consider whether modifications make a 
derivative work, we cannot just look at the modifications them-
selves, but must look at whether the modifications represent an 
original work. 
Return now to the first sentence of the definition of de-
rivative right, which reads in full: A derivative work is a 
work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionaliza-
tion, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.243 This sentence also 
emphasizes the process of transformation. None of the exam-
ples envisions a simple injection of expression. Although two of 
the examplesabridgment and condensationenvision a 
removal of expression, those words are different from deletion 
and plausibly can be read to exclude, for example, a version of a 
novel with a few carefully selected words removed. A holistic 
 
 240. For the statutory definition, see 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 241. Id. 
 242. The approach of examining the modifications themselves for original-
ity might appear to find support in the words as a whole. This phrase, how-
ever, simply makes clear that the effect of modifications on the original work 
must be examined as a whole. If the phrase meant only that all modifications 
must be considered together, then the phrase would be superfluous. See, e.g., 
Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878) (applying the canon that a 
legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous words). In the absence of 
the phrase as a whole, the sentence would refer to modifications which rep-
resent an original work of authorship. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. This is grammati-
cally distinct from modifications which represent original works of author-
ship. The structure of the sentence thus already makes clear that the 
modifications must be considered cumulatively, and the phrase as a whole 
reflects that the cumulative effect of modifications can be assessed only 
through consideration of the work itself. 
 243. 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000). 
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approach similarly can give significance to the words recast, 
transformed, or adapted in the first sentence of the definition 
of derivative work, serving to distinguish them from weaker 
alternatives like modified or changed. Here as well, Con-
gresss word choice suggests that legislators imagined both that 
the transformation would involve some degree of originality 
and that the result would be more than merely an altered work. 
The most powerful argument, however, for considering the 
effects of modifications rather than the modifications alone, is 
based on logic rather than linguistic analysis. It is nonsensical 
to assess modifications without at least some consideration of 
the original work. Modifications have meaning only with re-
spect to what is being modified, and whether modifications cu-
mulatively represent an original work necessarily depends on 
the degree to which the modified work is transformed. An ap-
proach that assesses whether modifications are sufficient with-
out considering the effect of those modifications on the work in 
effect looks at editing marks as if they were written on pages 
formed in invisible ink that has since disappeared. Such an 
analysis may be enough to determine whether the modifica-
tions themselves are original, but this is irrelevant when what 
someone seeks to protect is not a set of modifications but a de-
rivative work. 
Copyright law may protect a haiku as completely as it pro-
tects an encyclopedia.244 And a haiku may be sufficiently origi-
nal on its own that when added to another haiku, the collection 
amounts to a derivative work of each haiku. But that does not 
mean that when a haiku is added to an encyclopedia, we have a 
new encyclopedia. Adding a haiku to an encyclopedia and then 
reselling the product surely would violate the reproduction 
right, but it should not be seen as violating the derivative right. 
As both a matter of language and logic, the derivative right 
has been misconceived by focusing solely on what is added 
rather than on what is being added to. My analysis suggests 
new definitions of both the derivative right and the reproduc-
tion right. As currently interpreted, the definition of reproduc-
tion would cover most derivative works because unauthorized 
sequels and movies would probably count as unauthorized re-
productions of characters, and possibly settings, under current 
 
 244. Some phrases may be so short that they are denied copyright protec-
tion. See, e.g., Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 
544 (2d Cir. 1959) (requiring an appreciable amount of original text). 
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law.245 In my definition, however, unauthorized sequels and 
movies probably would not be covered by the reproduction right 
because the adaptations will tend to compete only minimally 
with the original work.246 A textual case for this redefinition of 
the reproduction right is consistent with the textual case for 
the redefinition of the derivative right. The reproduction right 
is a right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phon-
orecords.247 It is a stretch to consider the individual charac-
ters, rather than a Harry Potter book as a whole to, count as a 
work.248 My definition thus offers a more plausible reading of 
the statutory text for both rights. 
B. APPLICATIONS 
My suggested approach would not require wholesale repu-
diation of case law. Courts have adopted overlapping defini-
tions of the reproduction and derivative rights in part because 
litigants have had little incentive to encourage more precision 
in separating the rights. In the vast majority of cases, distin-
guishing the rights would not make a difference in the ultimate 
determination of whether there is a copyright violation. The 
courts likely will never consider whether a decolorized movie 
violated the derivative right, because it would violate the re-
production right.249 There are thus relatively few cases that 
squarely force the courts to distinguish the rights. Fixing the 
doctrine in this area might require the lower courts to repudi-
ate statements in earlier cases, but not in a way that would af-
 
 245. See supra Part I.B. 
 246. See supra text accompanying note 230. 
 247. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (Supp. II 2002). 
 248. An implication of my approach is thus that characters ordinarily 
would not be independently copyrightable. Note that this would have little ef-
fect in the Stallone case, because in that case the script would have been an 
unauthorized derivative work. See supra notes 4149 and accompanying text. 
The economic approach does not rule out altogether the possibility of copyright 
on characters, however. Suppose, for example, that some people were in the 
business of creating characters, which they would then sell to authors to in-
corporate in books. In that case, a character would be a work unto itself, but in 
the absence of independent marketing and sale of characters, characters 
would be part of other works. Moreover, this approach does not foreclose the 
possibility that independent parts of a work, such as frames of a movie, would 
be independently copyrightable. While a character does not seem to meet the 
plain language definition of a work, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), a movie still 
plausibly counts as an independent work. While an individual character or-
dinarily cannot be marketed independently of a broader work, a movie still 
can be marketed independently. 
 249. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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fect the result of the vast majority. The Supreme Court, in any 
event, has had no occasion to clarify the difference between the 
reproduction and derivative rights, and might usefully clarify 
the difference between the doctrines. 
1. The Derivative Right 
Because of the overlap in existing doctrine governing the 
reproduction right and the derivative right, much of the case 
law concerning derivative works arises from unusual situations 
in which the reproduction right is not violated, but the deriva-
tive right is not in issue. This can occur, for example, when 
someone purchases the original work, alters it, and resells it. 
Purchasing a work and reselling it unaltered would be pro-
tected by the first sale doctrine,250 so the copyright holder relies 
on the derivative right instead. Such cases often seem to reflect 
novel forms of intellectual property protection in search of a 
textual hook in copyright law, and the derivative right may 
serve as a substitute for European-style moral rights. Perhaps 
the derivative right should serve a number of functions, though 
it also may be that the derivative right serves such functions 
only because it otherwise would seem to lack an independent 
justification. My purpose here, in any event, is to consider ap-
plication of the derivative right pursuant to the core justifica-
tion that I have developed here, not to contemplate the possibil-
ity that the derivative right might serve as the basis of a very 
different argument. 
Let us start with the different results in Mirage Editions, 
Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,251 and Lee v. A.R.T. Co.252 In 
both cases, the defendant A.R.T. was in the business of cutting 
up art reproductions, mounting the reproductions individually 
onto ceramic tiles, and selling the resulting tile art.253 In Mi-
rage, the reproductions came from a commemorative book col-
lecting the work of a single artist,254 while in Lee, the reproduc-
tions appeared individually on notecards and lithographs.255 
The Ninth Circuit found a violation of the derivative right in 
 
 250. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) (allowing an individual who purchases a 
copyrighted work to resell that work without violating the copyright). 
 251. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 252. 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 253. Id. at 580; Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342. 
 254. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342. 
 255. Lee, 125 F.3d at 580. 
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Mirage,256 but the Seventh Circuit did not in Lee.257 Although 
Judge Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to 
follow the Ninth Circuit,258 the analysis in this paper provides a 
plausible, though not definitive, basis for harmonizing the two 
cases. 
The plaintiffs in Mirage presumably were not concerned 
about the tiles interfering with sales of the book, but rather 
about the loss of possible sales from other derivative works of 
the underlying art.259 This fits squarely within the proposed 
test for violation of the derivative right. In Lee, however, the 
concern presumably was that the tiles might compete directly 
with the original notecards and lithographs, perhaps even mak-
ing the originals seem like cheaper, less attractive products.260 
A ceramic tile artwork may be a close substitute for a litho-
graph, which, unlike a book, a consumer is likely to hang on the 
wall. Such substitution is directly relevant under this Articles 
test only for analysis of the reproduction right, but the repro-
duction right was irrelevant because no actual reproduction oc-
curred.261 
So far as the facts of Lee reveal, the only derivative works 
of the underlying art that Lee hoped to shield from competition 
were the notecards and lithographs themselves,262 but this type 
of competition is no greater than would have existed if A.R.T. 
had simply resold the notecards and lithographs, a type of com-
petition that the first sale doctrine protects.263 While in Mirage 
the plaintiffs appear to have been genuinely concerned with 
 
 256. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1344. 
 257. Lee, 125 F.3d at 583. 
 258. Id. 
 259. The Ninth Circuit noted that the artists work had appeared in many 
different forms. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342 (Patrick Nagel was an artist whose 
works appeared in many media including lithographs, posters, serigraphs, and 
as graphic art in many magazines . . . .). There was no similar statement in 
Lee. 
 260. Lee, 125 F.3d at 582. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 58081. 
 263. Judge Easterbrook explicitly indicated concern that Lees theory 
seemed to imply that it would make criminals out of art purchasers who 
framed prints that they had bought. Id. (If mounting works a transforma-
tion, then changing a paintings frame or a photographs mat equally produces 
a derivative work. Indeed, if Lee is right about the meaning of the definition's 
first sentence, then any alteration of a work, however slight, requires the au-
thor's permission.). 
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business stealing from authorized adaptations,264 in Lee, the 
plaintiffs appear to be attempting to use the derivative right 
only as a backstop to the reproduction right.265 A.R.T.s actions 
might have seemed more troubling if Lee had separately been 
marketing tile versions of the art, or if such marketing would 
have been a likely avenue of commercial exploitation in the ab-
sence of A.R.T.s adaptation. Under this hypothetical, there 
would be a violation of the derivative right as defined here, but 
the possibility of such business stealing from authorized adap-
tations is not as apparent in Lee as in Mirage. 
This analysis helps identify what should be the focus of the 
current controversy regarding CleanFlicks,266 a company that 
purchases and then alters VHS and DVD movies to eliminate 
content such as foul language, nudity, and violence that some 
consumers find offensive, and rents the videos to consumers.267 
Because the company purchases the videos, there is no viola-
tion of the reproduction right.268 Whether there is a violation of 
the derivative right as conceived here depends on whether the 
sanitized films might compete with alternative transformations 
that the copyright owners plausibly might create to generate 
profits. Where this is so, there is at least a possibility of eco-
nomic harm. The copyright owner has an interest in controlling 
investments in improvements and alterations, and CleanFlicks 
plausibly might prevent a copyright owner from selling clean 
versions, including perhaps made-for-television versions, at as 
high a premium as it otherwise would be able to obtain. As al-
ways, there are benefits to such competition, but copyright law 
plausibly maximizes social welfare by preventing redundant 
creation of derivative works. If creation of an authorized clean 
version is unlikely to be a profitable means of exploiting the  
 
 
 264. See Mirage, 856 F.2d at 134243. 
 265. See Lee, 125 F.3d at 582. 
 266. See Clean Flicks Home Page, http://www.cleanflicks.com (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2005). 
 267. For a discussion of litigation relating to this practice, see Mary 
Meehan, Cleaning Agents: Rental Companies Scrub DVDs for G-Rated View-
ing While the Issue Plays Through the Courts, LEXINGTON- HERALD LEADER, 
July 12, 2003, at H1; see also Rick Lyman, Hollywood Balks at High Tech 
Sanitizers; Some Video Customers Want Tamer Films, and Entrepreneurs 
Rush to Comply, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at E1 (discussing filmmakers' re-
actions to the proliferation of companies that produce sanitized versions of 
Hollywood films). 
 268. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
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original movie, and if the unauthorized clean version would not 
interfere with other potential authorized transformations, then 
the danger of rent dissipation from redundant adaptations is 
much lower. 
Even more offensive to many consumers than sex and vio-
lence is advertising, and the scope of derivative works was an 
issue in the controversy over the automatic ad-skipping feature 
of ReplayTV.269 Content producers feared this feature even 
more than they feared the remote control and the fast-forward 
button.270 Those features similarly allow consumers to skip 
commercials but require television watchers to lift their fingers 
to achieve the desired effect and therefore may often be too 
much trouble.271 While the content producers real concern was 
that consumers would not pay the time price that they levy for 
access to their content, they did not focus on alleged violation of 
their reproduction right.272 The content producers claimed that 
the ReplayTV created an unauthorized derivative work, pro-
ducing a television show minus the ads.273 Does ReplayTV 
compete with plausible authorized transformations of television 
shows? Television networks do repackage content into ad-free 
DVDs, but these typically appear sufficiently after the original 
air date that competition seems likely to be minimal. In theory, 
content producers might offer ad-free versions of programming 
on alternative premium cable television stations, but they do 
not appear on the verge of doing this. Thus, the ad-skipping 
feature likely should not count as contributing to creation of in-
fringing derivative works under current market conditions, but 
this might change in the future. 
 
 
 269. ReplayTVs manufacturer eventually resolved the lawsuit by removing 
the ability to skip commercials automatically. See Eric A. Taub, ReplayTVs 
New Owners Drop Features that Riled Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, 
at C1. Owners of ReplayTV units filed a declaratory judgment suit against the 
plaintiffs in the original action. Newmark v. Turner Broad. Network, 226 F. 
Supp. 2d 1215, 121718 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing the lawsuit that also in-
volved other copyright issues, and resolving threshold motions). 
 270.  See Taub, supra note 269, at C1. 
 271.  Id. 
 272. The argument here would need to be that the ReplayTV contributorily 
infringed by encouraging consumer taping, but this argument has little to do 
with the ad-skipping feature. Moreover, it seems a stretch given Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, which held that time shifting (recording a televised 
program to watch later) on a Betamax video tape recorder was fair use. 464 
U.S. 417, 45456 (1984). 
 273. See Taub, supra note 269, at C1. 
ABRAMOWICZ_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:49:18 AM 
384 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:317 
 
As a final example of the scope of the derivative right, con-
sider the permissibility of unauthorized appropriation art,274 
which incorporates artistic or other images into new contexts, 
often in an effort to comment critically on the original.275 A re-
cent case, for example, considered whether a sculpture of a pho-
tograph of puppies infringed the photograph.276 The rent dissi-
pation approach would emphasize that the copyright owners 
were extremely unlikely to exploit their photograph by creating 
a sculptural work that would make a presumably ironic com-
ment on the original, and therefore no rent dissipating competi-
tion resulted. With other photographsfor example, the now 
famous photograph of firemen lifting the American flag at the 
World Trade Center site277exploitation by the author might 
have been more likely. It is irrelevant that the puppy photo-
graph copyright owners might have been willing to license the 
sculpture, for the concern is with destructive competition, not 
with the original copyright owners profits per se. It is also pos-
sible, of course, that the puppy sculpture might be protected 
under fair use, but my analysis makes it unnecessary to even 
consider whether fair use applies. 
2. The Reproduction Right 
Just as my approach to the derivative right could save ap-
propriation art, so too might this Articles approach to the re-
production right save artistic and musical genres that involve 
the combination of large numbers of copyrighted works. Con-
sider, for example, collages of copyrighted works, where the as-
sembled works are owned by many copyright owners. There is a 
strong case based on transaction costs for allowing such works 
without permission, because it might be very expensive to con- 
 
 
 274. For a discussion of copyright issues associated with appropriation art, 
see William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art: 
An Economic Approach 15 (Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 113, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=253332 (follow Docu-
ment Delivery hyperlink; then follow Download the document from: Social 
Science Research Network hyperlink). 
 275. For examples of appropriation art, see MNAC Artist Registry, Metro-
politan Nashville Arts Commission, http://www.artsnashville.org/registry/ 
index.php?scan=msst&main=style&offset=0&id=19 (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). 
 276. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 277. See Christine Temin, Memorializing an Iconic Moment, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 16. 2002, at D1 (discussing the photograph and the controversy 
over a plan to turn it into a sculpture). 
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tact the many copyright owners of each of the included works 
for permission and to change a work should permission not be 
granted. Furthermore, an application of fair use, infused with 
transaction costs considerations, might save such an art form 
anyway.278 In the ordinary case, however, collages will not sub-
stitute for the original copyrighted work, and the reproduction 
right would not be violated under this Articles test, even 
though direct copying was involved. At the same time, few 
copyright owners will exploit copyrighted works by creating or 
licensing collages, so the derivative right is not violated either. 
Similarly, this interpretation could save sound sampling,279 at 
least where the sound sampling combines a sufficiently large 
number of songs to make the end product neither a substitute 
for, nor a competitor with, any authorized transformation of 
any single work. The interpretation thus calls into question, for 
example, the Sixth Circuits recent decision in Bridgeport Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Dimension Films,280 which concluded that a sound 
recording owner had an exclusive right to sample his own re-
cording. 
C. INDEPENDENT COPYRIGHTABILITY OF DERIVATIVE WORKS 
Although my primary purpose in developing this economic 
approach is to help determine whether the derivative and re-
production rights have been violated, the analysis also may be 
of direct use in case law considering the amount of originality 
required for a derivative work to obtain an independent copy-
right. Such cases typically arise when works are created from 
material in the public domain.281 They may also arise when a 
copyright owner copyrights a derivative work of an already 
copyrighted work, and the first copyrighted work subsequently 
enters the public domain, or when the creator of the new work 
has a license to use preexisting work and seeks to obtain an in-
 
 278. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1600, 162830 (1982) (discussing the transactions cost approach to fair 
use doctrine). 
 279. See generally Erick J. Bohlman, Comment, Squeezing the Square Peg 
of Digital Sound Sampling into the Round Hole of Copyright Law: Who Will 
Pay the Piper?, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 797 (1992) (reviewing copyright law concern-
ing sound sampling). 
 280. 383 F.3d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 2004), aff d, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 281. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 49192 (2d Cir. 
1976) (en banc). 
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dependent copyright.282 The doctrine in this area has been in-
consistent. While some courts have required no more than a 
distinguishable variation from the original for a work to ob-
tain copyright,283 others have emphasized that merely trivial 
variations will not be enough.284 
The analysis above suggests one possibility: an authorized 
work should count as an independently copyrightable deriva-
tive work if, had it not been authorized and had the earlier 
work been protected by copyright, the new work would violate 
the derivative right but not the reproduction right under this 
Articles proposed definitions. Thus, an authorized work would 
be entitled to a copyright as a derivative work if it was suffi-
ciently different from the original that it would not signifi-
cantly compete with the original and yet sufficiently similar 
that it might compete with authorized transformations of the 
original.285 Ensuring that a work would not be within the re-
production right may seem to be an obvious way of preventing 
trivial modifications from entitling a work to an independent 
copyright. Under current doctrine, however, the reproduction 
and derivative rights overlap to such an extent that this defini-
tion would mean that virtually no works would qualify. Regard-
less of whether courts enact this Articles proposed reformula-
tion of the reproduction right, they could use its 
conceptualization of that right to identify works that are too 
similar to the original to qualify for an independent copyright. 
Consider, for example, Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, in 
which Judge Posner found insufficient originality in a painting, 
intended for use in a collectors plate, combining characters and 




 282. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 90911 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (concluding that the originality requirement has particular signifi-
cance in the case of derivative works based on copyrighted preexisting works). 
 283. See Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 
565 (3d Cir. 2002); Donald v. Zack Meyers T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 
1029 (5th Cir. 1970); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 
(2d Cir. 1951). 
 284. See Boyd, supra note 236, at 35361. 
 285. The consequence of failing the second part of the test would be less 
severe than the consequence of failing the first. If a transformation were so 
radical that the new work would not compete with either the original or with 
authorized transformations of the original, then it would be entitled to a copy-
right as an independent work. 
 286. 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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ner concluded that a derivative work must be substantially 
different from the underlying work to be copyrightable.287 
Judge Posner, however, did not provide a framework for deter-
mining what counts as substantially different. A collectors 
plate with an image adapted from the movie would not effect 
substantial demand diversion from the movie itself, so it would 
not violate the reproduction right, even though it would be a 
derivative work. Under the test proposed here, it therefore 
would be entitled to an independent copyright.288 Of course, if 
owners of copyright in The Wizard of Oz previously had created 
a similar collectors plate that would be a market substitute for 
the new collectors plate,289 then the new plate might well in-
fringe the original plate, if the substantial similarity require-
ment is met.290 
 
 287. Id. 
 288. The same result probably would not obtain if the plate merely con-
sisted of a frame from the movie, for two reasons. First, although the economic 
approach rejects the proposition that adding original content is sufficient to 
create a derivative work, it does not question the proposition that some origi-
nality is necessary for creation of a derivative work. Slapping a movie still on a 
plate encompasses only trivial originality. Second, each frame of a movie itself 
would be an independently copyrighted work. See supra note 248. It seems 
plausible that collectors plates would interfere directly with any efforts to 
market individual movie stills in any form, and not solely with efforts to mar-
ket transformations of these frames onto plates. 
 289. Indeed, in Gracen, the Wizard of Oz copyright owners did market a 
separate collectors plate, although it is not clear whether that plate was cre-
ated first. 698 F.2d at 304. The issue was probably irrelevant in Gracen itself, 
because the court suggested, without reaching the issue, that Gracen, the 
creator of the purportedly derivative work, did not have the necessary permis-
sion to seek an independent copyright on the derivative work. Id. at 305 ([W]e 
do not think the difference is enough to allow her to copyright her painting 
even if, as we very much doubt, she was authorized by Bradford to do so.). 
 290. Posner justified the substantially different requirement by citing 
courts evidentiary need to determine whether subsequent works built on the 
original, the purportedly derivative work, or on other derivative works. Id. at 
304. Judge Posner thus might lament that it will be necessary to consider the 
type of evidentiary question that he had sought to avoid. What he did not ac-
knowledge, however, is that it often will be necessary to consider whether de-
rivative works infringe one another or merely build on the original, when the 
original is in the public domain. He may have ignored this point only because 
of the unusual posture of Gracen itself, where Gracens purported derivative 
work was an authorized licensee of the original. Id. at 301. Judge Posner was 
understandably concerned that the Wizard of Oz copyright holders would have 
to defend themselves against allegations that they had copied Gracens plate, 
rather than making their own. Id. But Gracen would bear the burden of proof 
on an infringement claim, and this factual scenario is sufficiently unusual that 
it should not determine the broader doctrine determining copyrightability of a 
derivative work. 
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CONCLUSION 
Abolition of the derivative right would have large conse-
quences, quite possibly negative. Copyright races would force 
authors to hurry creation of adaptations of their own works. 
Unauthorized adaptations, meanwhile, might provide some 
value to consumers, but these works might simply reflect shifts 
in resources from production of more original copyrighted 
works, as well as from other markets. The derivative right, of 
course, is in no great danger, and indeed the larger danger is 
that the derivative right will be interpreted too broadly. This 
Articles task has been to defend the existence of the derivative 
right, but the theoretical apparatus that the Article has sup-
plied may, in practice, be most important for constraining ag-
gressive interpretations of the derivative and reproduction 
rights. Courts should not extend the derivative right to works 
that would not compete with plausible authorized transforma-
tions, nor should they extend the reproduction right to works 
that would not compete with the original. 
 
